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Objectives of the study  
 
The objective of the thesis is to investigate the link between gender and corruption. Increasing 
gender equality has been proposed to help reduce levels of corruption societies, as women are 
sometimes seen as less prone to corrupt behavior than men are. An important question is, whether 
women universally show less corrupt behavior than men. Furthermore, understanding of the 
possible explanations for any gender differences and their plausibility are essential to understand 
whether increasing the share of women in public life could have the desired effect of limiting levels 
of corruption. 
 
Methodology 
 
The study consists of a literature review and an empirical analysis utilizing micro-level survey data 
from 107 different countries. Academic literature on gender and corruption is analyzed to 
understand what findings have already been made; what is the relationship between gender and 
corruption outcomes and what kinds of theories have been proposed  to explain the findings. The 
relationship between gender and self-reported bribery and other factors related to corruption are 
analyzed using a binomial probit method.  
 
Results 
 
The main findings are that women appear as less likely to engage in self-reported bribery and the 
most likely reason behind this is a difference in the way public officials treat women and men. 
Gender discrimination may be an important mediating factor in this. Gender differences in risk 
aversion as a factor to explain gender differences in bribery does not receive support from the 
analysis. Neither is there any evidence to suggest that there would be any difference between men 
and women in propensity to engage in bribery if equal treatment of the genders was given. 
Considering the findings, a universal policy rule promoting gender equality as an instrument to fight 
corruption seems ill-advised. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Discussion on the relationship between gender and corruption has gone on for years. Many argue that 
women tend to behave less corrupt than men and there have been proposals to increase women’s 
share in public life in developing countries as a possible ‘cure for corruption’ (Goetz, 2007). 
Academic research has found out that women often appear as engaging in corruption less often than 
men and that there indeed are correlations between higher gender equality and lower corruption levels 
in societies. However, the topic still lacks research as indicated in many reviews siding the topic (e.g. 
Boehm, 2015) 
 
It remains a question of interest, whether women actually universally tend to engage in corruption 
less than men do. Also the mechanism behind this gender difference is unclear, although several 
explanations have been proposed. I find it worthwhile to examine these questions with the help of 
data. Transparency International gathers the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) with household 
surveys conducted in 107 countries worldwide for the last round in 2013 and this data has not been 
previously used to approach the gender-corruption debate.   
 
My main results, based on a literature review of previous research and a statistical analysis of the 
GCB 2013 data confirm that women are less likely to engage in bribery. The mechanism that is most 
supported by the data to explain this finding is that women are treated differently from men by public 
officials, which leads to less frequent corrupt transactions when women are involved. There is few 
evidence to back a hypothesis that women would behave any less corrupt than men, given similar 
treatment.  
 
Therefore, promoting gender equality as an instrument to fight corruption seems ill-advised as a 
universal policy rule. This naturally does not mean that promoting gender equality could not be 
advisable for other reasons.  
 
 
1.1 Background and motivation 
 
Corruption is widely agreed to be a hindrance to sustainable economic growth (Aidt, 2009). Although 
the question is also of inherent interest, the gender aspect to corruption research initially emerged as 
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academics and policymakers were interested in the possibility of increasing the share of women in 
public life to decrease levels of corruption. This was motivated by findings that women often 
appeared to behave more public-spirited than men did (Goetz, 2007). A discussion of gender 
differences in corruption and the possibility that women might be less corrupt than men took off in 
the change of the millennium with the publication of two influential articles Are women really the 
‘fairer’ sex? Corruption and women in government (Dollar et al 2000) and Gender and Corruption 
(Swamy et al 2001). Both the articles conclude that there is a robust relationship between female 
participation in societies and lower levels of corruption. Yet as subsequent criticism points out, the 
causality is unclear. Since then, a sizable literature has emerged with researchers approaching the 
question from different perspectives. 
 
Researchers have yet to reach a widely agreed-upon consensus on whether promoting women’s 
position in societies could help in fighting corruption. However, several development agencies have 
instated policies based on the existing research stock. A strong relationship has sometimes been 
asserted between relatively high levels of female involvement in public life and low levels of 
corruption in governments  (World Bank, 2001; Goetz, 2007; Sung, 2012; Council of Europe, 2014). 
Perhaps the most influential use of the hypothesis has been in the widely debated World Bank policy 
statement on gender equality, Engendering Development report. Although it is often concluded that 
promoting gender equality is not harmful even when done for questionable reasons (Treisman, 2007, 
Boehm, 2015), it is important at least from an intellectual honesty point of view that we strive to 
acquire the best possible knowledge on the issue. Inadequately informed beliefs of ‘inherent qualities’ 
of women may also backfire unexpectedly on efforts to promote true gender equality.  
 
The literature on the gender-corruption relationship is still constantly expanding (see e.g. Breen et al, 
2015; Boehm, 2015; Debski & Jetter, 2015) after fifteen years of debate and a myriad of research. A 
recently emerged hypothesis is that institutional and cultural context should play a major mediating 
role in the formation of the relationship (Esarey & Chirillo, 2013; Breen et al, 2015), but research 
focusing on the hypothesis is scarce to date. Seen how experimental evidence varies significantly 
according to the location of experiments (Chaudhuri, 2012), the role of institutions deserves more 
examination.  
 
As with most of the questions related to corruption, there are two critical obstacles to exact research. 
On the one hand there has been the difficulty to define what counts as corruption. No single 
uncontested measure exists to capture the absolute level of corruption in any given setting. On the 
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other hand, measuring any given proxy to the level of corruption is challenging. As corruption by 
definition involves clandestine acts, it is challenging to elicit truthful data from economic actors on 
their performance regarding corruption. Therefore, much of earlier empirical research has relied upon 
surveys third-party perceptions of aggregate corruption levels in entire countries, such as the 
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index.  
 
Measuring corruption by perceptions has been justifiably criticized (Reinikka & Svensson, 2006; 
Donchev & Ujhelyi, 2014) for potential biases and in the last decade better data based on actual 
experiences of households and businesses have been collected in several surveys such as the World 
Bank  Enterprise Surveys and Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer. As relatively 
reliable experience-based data has not existed for a long time, empirical research utilizing the new 
data sources is still rather scarce. Therefore, it is highly interesting to apply one of these new-fangled 
datasets to the gender-corruption question, especially as this type of corruption data is often 
considered an improvement in reliability and accuracy over third-party perceptions (Reinikka & 
Svensson, 2006; Treisman, 2007). Micro-level data also data lets us examine patterns in behaviour 
of individual actors over a large sample, which can be compared with the results from surveys of 
expert opinions and small-scale experiments. 
 
Furthermore, a large part of the existing research concentrates on corruption in the higher echelons 
of societies and business with the low-level corruption in household context relatively less researched. 
Therefore, I choose to utilise the Global Corruption Barometer survey collected by Transparency 
International, which surveys households in 107 countries worldwide for their experiences in 
corruption. Doing so I can reveal some novel information on the connection between gender and 
corruption in ordinary citizens’ dealings with public officials.  
 
I contribute to past empirical and experimental studies, shedding new light on the findings made on 
the gender-corruption connection to date. A major shortcoming of my work is that I cannot establish 
a causal mechanism based on the data. However, based on the observed patterns and theoretical 
framing, I can make educated evaluations on the possible factors and mechanisms driving the results.  
 
 
1.2 Research question and methodology 
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The research question of this study consists of two parts. First, I want to establish an answer to the 
question ‘Are women universally less likely to engage in bribery?’ The second step is to ask ‘What 
are likely causal mechanisms behind gender differences in bribery?’ As opposed to the wider 
phenomenon of corruption, I focus on bribery in the research questions due to data availability.  
 
The study consists of a review of existing literature and an empirical analysis designed on the basis 
of earlier findings. The empirical analysis is based on experience-based survey data from 113 270 
households living across 107 countries over five continents, collected by Transparency International 
for the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) 2013 round. I come up with five hypotheses that I test 
utilizing four binary dependent variables drawn from four different survey questions of the GCB 
2013. I apply a binomial probit model to estimate the effect of gender and other relevant independent 
variables on the dependent variables. Additionally, I run OLS regressions with identical specifications 
as a robustness check.  
 
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
 
Chapters two to four make up the literature review. I begin in chapter 2 with general definitions of 
concepts, theoretical considerations and some background information on the determinants and 
effects of corruption. Chapter 3 concentrates on what previous research has uncovered of the 
relationship between gender and corruption. Chapter 4 then ends the literature review with a review 
of the theories proposed in previous literature to explain the gender differences in corruption.  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 make up the empirical study. In chapter 5, I introduce the data, define hypotheses 
and construct variables from the data.  Analysis and discussion of the results I present in Chapter 6, 
finally ending in short conclusions in chapter 7.  
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2. Corruption and its Measurement  
 
In this chapter, I first discuss some central definitions and establish the position of my study within 
the literature on corruption. Further, I consider the shortcomings in measuring corruption and the 
limitations those set for empirical research on the theme. The rest of the chapter consists of a review 
in research of consequences and determinants of corruption apart from gender.  
 
The key points of the chapter lie in positioning my study and providing essential background 
information on what the common understanding is on corruption. My study fits in the niche of 
bureaucratic corruption in a household context with the results partly generalizable to corruption in 
general. The choice of experience-based survey data as the basis for analysis is informed by literature 
in measurement of corruption. Corruption is usually found harmful for societies, but especially for 
the individual it is sometimes the best solution to manage dealings with the public sector and in some 
cases it may be beneficial for a society in the short term (Aidt, 2009). Several personal characteristics 
of individuals emerge as potential correlates of corrupt outcomes. I will apply this information in the 
choice of control variables.  
 
2.1. Central definitions 
 
Research on corruption applies a wide range of interrelated concepts and sub-concepts, the difference 
between which needs to be carefully defined and understood to make sense of the larger image. 
Therefore I shortly define some of the central ideas and identify which of them I am focusing on in 
this work. 
 
Corruption may have different meanings to different people and under different contexts. A concept 
I use in this study is ‘public corruption’ (e.g. Pardo, 2004). Public corruption again can be defined 
narrowly as ‘sale of government property for private gain’ (Aidt, 2009) – or more broadly as ‘misuse 
of public office for private gain’ (Svensson, 2005), which in addition to the sale of government 
property captures for example kickbacks in public procurement, bribery and embezzlement of 
government funds. The most important function of corrupt acts can be concluded as that they aim at 
private gain acquired by abuse of position in an organization. It is also worth noting that the private 
gain needs not be monetary, the currency exchanged may be in-kind, such as sexual favors (Goetz, 
2007), which are not captured when measuring monetary transfers. 
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An important acknowledgement when defining corruption is that the boundaries of what is 
understood as corruption may shift over cultures. An act considered corruption somewhere may 
elsewhere be an accepted customary practice, such as families bringing gifts to teachers of their 
children. Similarly, in many countries, when applying for a passport, one can legally receive 
expedited service with additional payments, while in other countries similar payments may be 
customarily inofficial. Thus, we need to consider local rules and customs when understanding the 
definition of corruption and how it is viewed in a certain context (Banerjee et al, 2012).  
 
Bribery, embezzlement, clientelism, nepotism, and vote-buying are different manifestations of the 
corruption (Serra & Wantchekon, 2012)., Bribery, defined as unauthorized transfer of money or an 
in-kind substitute, is the form of corruption that most empirical studies measure to proxy for 
corruption (Banerjee, 2012). Out of the different forms of corruption, bribery is a crude, but explicit 
and concrete form of action. This makes bribery relatively easy to quantify and measure relatively 
reliably, leading to most global data collection attempts focus on it.  For this reason, I follow the 
trodden path also in my study, focusing on the varying propensities to engage in bribery.   
 
In addition to the format, an important distinction between subconcepts of public corruption should 
be made between high-level and low-level corruption. Grand corruption, used for the high-level 
corruption refers to activities of politicians or bureaucrats with influence over large projects and 
important contracts (Søreide, 2006). High-level political networks and major stakes make grand 
corruption not only highly complex, but also challenging to measure, due to which there is no detailed 
data available for this type of corruption.    
 
The focus of my study lies in the other end of the scale at the transactions between low-level 
bureaucrats and ordinary citizens, which the GCB 2013 data covers. Terms used to describe activities 
in the low-level petty or bureaucratic corruption. When petty corruption takes place, small, even 
routinely payments are transferred between persons on lower level of institutions and e.g. households 
or business executives (Søreide, 2006).  In bureaucratic corruption, as opposed to grand corruption, 
where bribery often takes place in order for the briber to receive a special treatment, in bureaucratic 
corruption the bribe often acts as an insurance against adverse shocks (e.g. in a hospital to receive a 
treatment timely) (Justesen & Bjørnskov, 2014).  
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Another distinction worth acknowledging, but not necessary to discuss further in the scope of my 
study is that between households and business. On the low bureaucratic level in focus in this study 
there is no essential difference between households and businesses concerning the incentives to act 
corrupt or the consequences of corruption. Furthermore, as Chatterjee and Ray (2012) find, countries 
that face higher levels of individual corruption also tend to face higher levels of business corruption, 
proving the close linkage between these two types of corruption.  
 
Lastly, the payers of bribes in low-level bureaucratic corruption are sometimes referred to as ‘victims’ 
of corruption (see e.g. Justesen & Bjørnskov, 2014), as opposed to treating them as totally 
independent actors knowingly and willingly committing a potential crime. However, for the scope 
and focus of this study the distinction between victims and beneficiaries is not necessary, as bribe 
payments are always against the accepted moral code and fulfill the definition of corruption.  
 
 
2.2 Measurement of corruption 
 
As discussed before, corruption is an abstract concept can take many different forms, which implies 
limitations to its measurement. In this part, I discuss these limitations and different attempts to 
overcome them. After analyzing the arguments for and against the different available interfaces to 
reality of corruption, I conclude that survey data covering experiences of corruption is the most 
suitable measure for the scope and purpose of my study. 
 
Finding exact and unambiguous measures measuring the level of the entire phenomenon of corruption 
is not possible. Research focusing on corruption often proxies the underlying phenomenon of 
corruption with bribery, the most explicit form of the phenomenon. Bribery is also the focus area in 
this study. Explicit bribery can also be measured somewhat accurately by surveys of actual corruption 
experiences or experiments. Other widely used measures that try to capture either bribery or 
corruption in general include surveys of personal values and third-party perceptions of corruption. 
Personal values stated in surveys, however, do not necessarily reflect actual behavior and third-party 
perceptions are prone to subjective biases.  
 
Interpretation of different proxies of levels of corruption and bribery requires remarkable attention as 
none of the proxies necessarily captures the entire underlying phenomenon. This is proven by 
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significant differences found between the two types of measures most used in research; perception 
and experience surveys. These two types of measurements have produce mixed and in some cases 
even contradictory signals (Treisman, 2007; Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2010; Donchev & Ujhelyi, 
2014). There is some evidence that expert surveys tend to overestimate the amount of bureaucratic 
corruption faced by households when compared with household experience survey (Razafindrakoto 
& Roubaud, 2010). The correlation between corruption experiences and perceptions may not be very 
high even when a single sample of respondents are asked for both perceptions and experiences (Weber 
Abramo, 2008). These findings suggest that there are problems like subjective biases in forming of 
perceptions or that experience surveys do not capture truthful answers. Possibly the subjective and 
objective indices may also be explained by different factors (Svensson, 2005). 
 
Aggregate indicators that combine different measures of perceptions and experiences, such as the 
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index and the World Bank Control of Corruption 
Index exist and have seen widespread use in literature. They, however, intend to come to a single 
measure to estimate the level of corruption in a country and therefore lack a significant degree of 
detail important for understanding effects of personal traits linked with corrupt behavior. Also, the 
aggregate indices consist largely of subjective estimates by experts, which are likely to suffer from 
perception bias (Treisman, 2007). Furthermore, the widely used indices are likely to suffer from 
problems with the causal relationships as some of their components are highly intercorrelated 
(Reinikka & Svensson, 2006), (Knack, 2007). Also, ideological biases arising from the background 
of the sources of the evaluations cannot be ruled out (Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2010). 
 
As another approach to cope with the problems of subjective perceptions, several surveys seeking to 
obtain data based on actual experiences of corruptions. Some of the most prominent surveys 
questioning households or businesses include the Transparency International Global Corruption 
Barometer used in this study, World Bank Enterprise Surveys and UNICRI International Crime 
Victimisation Survey ICVS. Significantly, also these surveys vary in how they approach acquiring 
the information on corruption experiences, each with unique problems to each measure. Questions 
that have been used include e.g. whether respondents have simply been asked for bribes, or if they 
have actually been involved in a corrupt transaction. 
 
The data obtained from surveys, no matter how well designed, is also not exempt of biases and 
inaccuracies. As corruption by nature involves clandestine acts, the major weakness of the surveys 
inquiring for experiences of corruption is that individuals are not necessarily willing to reveal details 
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of any corrupt behavior. Respondent reticence is recognized as a problem especially with the most 
sensitive questions such as asking for personal involvement1 in corruption (Tourangeau & Yan, 
2007).  
 
The common strategies of respondents to protect themselves against potential detection and 
punishment are nonresponse and false response (Gutmann, Padovano & Voigt, 2015). Respondent 
reticence can increase further in politically repressive environments2, leading to potential 
understatement of corruption in countries with such environments (Jensen, Li & Rahman, 2010). The 
latter is especially harmful for cross-country comparisons.  
 
There are several methods proposed to minimize respondent reticence. On tactic is not to include 
questions incriminating the respondent directly, such as whether the respondent has been asked for 
bribes by officials. However, relatively accurate knowledge on the frequency of bureaucrats explicitly 
asking for bribes may not reveal the frequency of actual corrupt transactions taking place. A strategy 
often proposed to minimize reticence when eliciting information on corrupt dealings is to distance 
the respondent from the question while trying to ensure that the response reflects the true experience  
of the respondent as accurately as possible3 (Reinikka & Svensson, 2003; Clausen, Kraay & Murrell, 
2010). Also the GCB 2013 data that I base the empirical analysis on, includes a direct question asking 
for respondents’ involvement in corruption. The survey has been designed without a direct reference 
to the respondent in this particular question. 
 
Some surveys also ask respondents to specify amounts of bribes they have paid. Significant 
discrepancies are easily created there; results may differ significantly depending on for example 
whether the amount of bribes is asked to be specified in absolute monetary terms or as a percentage 
of sales (Clarke, 2010). This shortcoming of some surveys is not directly relevant to my empirical 
study, but is important to acknowledge for comparison with results from other studies that have used 
data for example from the World Bank Enterprise Survey. 
 
In addition to surveys on attitudes, perceptions and experiences of corruption, a widely used approach 
to examine corruption is through experiments. Existing experimental research in corruption has taken 
                                                 
1 Or in the case of a business, involvement of the organisation 
2 Data on businesses 
3 Instead of directly referring to the respondent, the survey question can refer to ‘people like you’ or ‘you or anyone else 
in your household’ (the form used in the GCB 2013 survey 
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place both in lab and on field. The experimental approach has an advantage of mitigating the 
measurement and endogeneity problems present in research based on perception indices and 
experience surveys. One of the strongest point of experimental studies in corruption research is in 
increasing understanding of both how corruption occurs and how potentially corrupt individuals 
respond to different sets of monetary and nonmonetary incentives (Serra & Wantchekon, 2012). 
However, it is unclear to what extent results obtained in laboratory experiments will be externally 
valid (Armantier & Boly, 2012).  Therefore, experimental studies may be useful in studying the 
mechanisms of corruption, but as standalone sources of information they are not useful to research 
describing the actual prevalence of corruption and its dynamics across countries.   
 
In addition to the mentioned methods to capture corruption, some novel and potentially less biased 
measures have spawned in the literature. For example, bribery has been systematically measured by 
using micro-level data on reported earnings, household spending and asset holdings where this kind 
of data is available4 (Gorodnichenko & Sabirianova Peter, 2007). This approach, however requires 
access to a large amount of potentially proprietary data and therefore is not easily applicable for 
measures spanning over several countries.  Another innovative take on the issue has been comparing 
the amounts of unpaid parking tickets from diplomatic staff of different countries in Manhattan, New 
York as a proxy for differences in levels of corruption in the respective countries (Fisman & Miguel, 
2007). Although probably less biased, the parking ticket measure is likely subject to substantial error 
and includes few detail. 
 
Considering the benefits and shortcomings of the existing indicators, combination of different types 
of indicators is probably necessary to achieve a comprehensive understanding of what we know about 
the prevalence of corruption. In my study, I choose to utilize a household survey on corruption 
experiences5. As discussed also above, survey datasets on experiences are a relatively new 
development in corruption research and to date have not seen as extensive use as for example some 
of the aggregate indicators. Furthermore, the micro data sets allow for a sufficient level of detail to 
examin the individual’s characteristics in explaining their experiences and behaviors (Chatterjee and 
Ray 2012).  
 
 
                                                 
4 A single study using data from a single country (Ukraine) 
5 Global Corruption Barometer dataset collected by the Transparency International 
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2.3 Consequences of corruption on the level of society and individuals 
 
Nowadays corruption is widely recognized as a major economic hindrance, as it is linked to many 
other economic problems. However, another point of view is that corruption might grease the wheels 
of societies through providing ways to circumvent suppressive regulation – which might hold true for 
certain trivial cases. Nevertheless, on the general level, corruption, quoted as the ‘Public Enemy 
Number One’ (World Bank, 2013) is seen as one of the most pressing hindrances to progress 
especially in developing countries.  
 
Numerous studies have linked corruption with other phenomena that act as direct obstacles to 
economic development. Inter alia, these phenomena include reduced investment (Lambsdorff, 2003; 
Mauro, 1995; Wei, 2000), diversion of public resources (Mauro, 1998; Olken, 2006) and increased 
business costs (Ades & Di Tella, 1997; Kaufmann, 1997; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993).  Corruption may 
not have a direct effect on the GDP or economic growth rate of a society in the short run, but indeed 
seems to have a negative effect on sustainability of economic development (Aidt, 2009). Furthermore, 
there is a clear interlinkage and measures to promote good governance may promote growth and vice 
versa (Holmberg, Rothstein & Nasiritousi, 2009). 
 
Apart from mere economic growth, there is evidence that the diversion of public resources caused by 
high and rising corruption may increase income inequality and poverty (Gupta, Davoodi & Alonso-
Terme, 2002). Other consequences found to have links with corruption and decreasing the quality of 
life in societies include inflation, increased crime, policy distortions and lack of competition 
(Lambsdorff J. G., 2005). 
 
Nevertheless, there is an ongoing debate of how much corruption may benefit societies through a 
proposed role in countering harmful regulation (Leff, 1964). Indeed, corrupt practices may for 
example facilitate firm entry in some highly regulated economies (Dreher & Gassebner, 2011). 
However, although corruption may help compensate bad governance, negative impacts of corruption 
to investment and growth tend to worsen when indicators of quality of governance deteriorate   (Meon 
& Sekkat, 2005). However, neither in the real world is complete absence of corruption optimal, as 
fighting corruption requires resources (Acemoglu & Verdier, 2000). 
 
Although corruption is harmful to societies in general, it is important to note that on the micro-level 
in certain types of environments, individual citizens or individual businesses may perceive corrupt 
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acts as a ‘necessary greasing the wheels’ to handle their dealings with the public sector. When the 
structures of a society set incentives to act corrupt, corruption may be generally seen as an at least 
quasi-legitimate to handle business, reducing moral costs and risks (Breen, Gillanders, McNulty & 
Suzuki, 2015). This again has implications to analyzing the behavior of individual citizens. For 
example, if a group of people were to show higher morals over other groups, it has to be reflected 
with what is considered moral behavior in the context in question.   
 
The effect of corruption on citizens and businesses can be seen as a sister activity to taxation. 
However, due to the illegality of corruption and the need of secrecy, it is much more distortionary 
and costly (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). It is primary the direct effect similar to taxes, which is found 
to lead to many of negative effects discussed before, e.g. reducing investment. However, as corruption 
is usually not based on any highly formal institution, the effect is not borne equally by all citizens 
(Wei S.-J. , 1997). This is likely to be among causes for the observation that more corrupt societies 
tend to be less equal (Gupta, Davoodi & Alonso-Terme, 2002).  
 
Not only individual citizens, but also individual businesses face differences in the corruption they 
face and are engaged in. Using enterprise survey data from Uganda, Svensson (2003) finds that there 
is considerable variation in bribe payments across seemingly similar firms. Therefore it is likely that 
the position of these companies varies over their ability to pay or bargain, i.e. refuse a bribe, 
potentially distorting fair competition. (Fan, Lin & Treisman, 2009)find that for businesses at least 
the size of the company and share of state ownership to some extent determine the frequency of 
bribery firms face to some extent. Large and state-owned companies are likely better equipped to face 
corruption and have better networks. 
 
 
2.4 Individual characteristics and corruption 
 
The focus of this study is in the connection between gender and corruption. Understanding the 
connection between other individual characteristics and the probability of individuals to encounter 
and get involved with corruption is essential to recognize, whether there might be other individual-
linked variables driving the results of my analysis. I will review past research in personal 
characteristics and corruption to develop this understanding and to be able to make informed 
decisions on the choice of relevant control variables. 
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The existing literature on general determinants of corruption at the level of an individual citizen or 
business is sparse compared to the work on cross-country measures. This is natural as eligible micro 
level measures relevant to corruption with a good coverage have been scarce until recently. Most of 
the literature has emerged in the previous ten years (e.g. Dong & Torgler, 2009; Dong et al., 2012; 
Guerrero & Rodríguez-Oreggia, 2008; Lee & Guven, 2013; Mocan, 2008; Svensson, 2003; Swamy 
et al., 2001; Torgler & Valev, 2006; Torgler & Valev, 2010). Sources of data have included the cross-
country ICVS survey (MOCAN) and a multitude of other regional or local.  
 
Age can be an important factor determining, whether individual citizens are prompted for bribes by 
officials. Lesser propensity to be asked for bribes has been found to be linked with both relatively 
young and old ages, which may result from young citizens not yet participating in society to the full, 
whereas older individuals again gradually shift out of the public life. This naturally leaves the people 
in their most active years to be asked for bribes more often than the other age groups (Seligson, 2006; 
Mocan, 2008). However, age may also affect personal values and personal justification of corruption 
has been found to decrease with age, robust for cohort effects (Torgler & Valev, 2006).  
 
Income is another factor that has some predicting power over how often a citizen is asked for bribes. 
It is somewhat natural that the citizens with the highest ability to pay are also asked for bribes most 
often (Mocan, 20086; Seligson, 20067). However, at least in some contexts there is evidence that after 
a certain threshold income, the frequency of actual corrupt transactions decreases, which may result 
from wealthier individuals being able to opt out of the corrupt public services and receive similar 
services from elsewhere (Justesen & Bjørnskov, 2014)8.  
 
There are also links between the level of education of the individual and the frequency of 
encountering corrupt officials asking for bribes. There is empirical evidence of a tendency that 
officials ask individuals with a higher level of education more often than those with a lower amount 
of schooling (Mocan, 2008). Although better educated individuals may be asked for bribes more often 
than the less educated, they have been found to be less accepting of corruption in some contexts 
(Truex, 20109) 
                                                 
6 Mocan (2008) utilises the UNICRI ICVS dataset with data from 49 countries 
7 Latin American data from several surveys of population 
8 Justesen and Bjørnskov (2014) draw their data from the Afrobarometer 
9 Data from Nepal street surveys 
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Living in cities, as opposed to living in rural areas has also emerged as a variable with some predicting 
power in some studies of both how often bribes are asked for and how often they are paid. This can 
result from the fact that there is usually a higher concentration of public sector services and also 
economic activity overall can be larger and more varied in scope in city like environments. A natural 
consequence of these is a higher likelihood to encounter corruption. Furthermore, contacts between 
public officials and citizens may be less personal in larger cities, whereas in rural areas potentially 
closer connections allow for other forms of corruption to overshadow crude bribery (Mocan, 2008; 
Justesen & Bjørnskov, 2014). 
 
Religiosity can also play a role in the relationship between an individual and corruption, but this has 
not been studied extensively. In on field experiment, however, more religious people were less likely 
to accept a bribe when one was offered (Armantier & Boly, 201110). However, this is likely to be 
highly dependent on the religion practiced and the relationship between religion and its context in 
society.  
 
Importantly, the effect of the individual characteristics of citizens may vary over different 
environments and differences can emerge even within relatively homogenous geographical areas 
(Seligson, 2006). This finding fosters an assumption that gender among other individual 
characteristics may not relate to corrupt behavior in a similar way in every context.  
 
A significant problem in most of the studies is that they do not include information of the likelihood 
of respondents to have had contact with public officials in the first place. Therefore, not too much 
emphasis can be put on the results reviewed in this chapter. However, the results inform me in the 
inclusion of control variables in the empirical analysis of my data.  
 
 
2.5 In which societies do we seem find corruption and who are considered corrupt? 
 
In the previous I summarized findings on individual characteristics and their relation to individual 
citizens encountering or committing corrupt acts. In the following I review shortly the qualities of 
societies, which are correlated with higher levels of corruption. 
                                                 
10 Field experiment in Burkina Faso, Africa 
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As discussed before, GDP levels and corruption correlate strongly with each other on a country level. 
The causal mechanism, however, is not necessarily clear and it is likely that the factors are interlinked 
(Holmberg;Rothstein;& Nasiritousi, 2009). GDP is not the only variable repeatedly found robustly 
related to corruption. Inter alia, corruption is lower in richer countries, where democratic institutions 
have been preserved for a long continuous period, and the population is mainly protestant. Corruption 
is again higher in countries where political instability is a major problem. Colonial heritage is also 
found as a significant determinant of corruption, the effect of which is determined by the quality of 
institutions founded by the colonialist country (Serra, 2005).  
 
Institutions matter in many ways. For example, countries with institutions favorable to competition 
have been found less corrupt, whereas Corruption is higher in countries where domestic firms are 
sheltered from foreign competition by natural or policy induced barriers to trade, with economies 
dominated by a few number of firms, or where antitrust regulations are not effective in preventing 
anticompetitive practices (Ades & Di Tella, 1999). The effect of democracy may be activated only in 
countries with a sufficient income level. (Jetter;Montoya Agudelo;& Ramirez Hassan, 2015) 
 
Treisman (2007) provides an extensive survey of the country-level determinants of both country-level 
corruption perceptions and experiences. Business people and citizens perceive states less corrupt 
when the states are highly developed, long-established liberal democracies, with a free and widely 
read press, a high share of women in government and a long record of openness to international trade. 
Countries with higher perceptions of corruption again are more likely to be dependent on fuel exports, 
have intrusive business regulations and suffer from unpredictable inflation. (Treisman, 2007) 
 
However, when it comes to experiences of corruption, Treisman (2007) finds that out of the factors 
found to reduce perception of corruption, definitely economic development does also reduce 
frequency for demands of bribes. He also finds that greater openness to imports may be to a minor 
extent associated with a lower reported frequency of bribery in business. Also more intrusive business 
regulation may according to Treisman (2007) lead to greater reported corruption, but that the size and 
robustness of the effect were less clear.  
 
It is clear that factors on the macro level such as institutional environment matter for corruption.  The 
country-level factors are not, however, in the focus of this study, but are of interest rather as a 
mediator to the effects of personal factors. I will include the country-level factors in the empirical 
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analysis in the form of country fixed effects. Regarding the effect of institutions, it is important to 
note that a strong democracy is found to be associated with fewer corruption. 
 
 
2.6 Theoretical framework 
 
Following Becker’s original framework (Becker, 1968), the main determinant of an individual’s 
behavior regarding corruption or other criminal acts is the expected utility of the individual for 
committing the act in question. Therefore, the probability of an individual to commit corruption is 
dictated by the chances of being caught, the gain from the corrupt activity and the individual’s 
personal characteristics such as moral values.  This yields in the first stage a model of the probability 
p for an individual i to be involved in a corrupt act as follows: 
 
pi = β
′Xi + νi  
 
Where β represents a vector of coefficients, vector X denotes factors and v denotes an unobserved 
error term.  
 
The types of characteristics that affect an individual’s propensity to engage in corrupt acts can also 
be further deconstructed to subsets. Relevant for the work at hand is e.g. a set that relates to an 
indiviual’s incentives related to corruption. Following to the framework by Becker (1968), 
individuals valuate their utility function costs and benefits derived from the corrupt act. Individuals 
consider the monetary and non-monetary profits, comparing them against the probability of detection 
and punishment, opportunity costs and moral costs to the act, which to a large extent vary by 
individual and between individuals (Guerrero & Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2008). Also, an individual’s 
indoctrination in relation to norms (R.E., 1988)and the degree of risk aversion an individual shows 
(Cadot, 1987) bear an effect on the outcome. 
 
Another set of characteristics that needs consideration is the social context. Theoretically, corruption 
may produce a vicious circle, where individuals see themselves partially forced to commit such acts, 
affecting the implicit system of values in a society and making the individual act corruptly based on 
rewards and incentives (Andvig & Moene, 1990). Also the factors related to the individual citizen 
must be viewed relative to the existing norms of the society, making these two sets partially 
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inseparable. However, for clarity and understanding, separating the country and individual specific 
factors yields the following model  
 
pii = β1
′Yi β2 
′Cj + νi + uj 
 
where p is the probability of committing a corrupt act, i denotes the individual, j the the country, β1 a 
vector of coefficients, Y a vector of factors related to the individual citizen, β2 a vector of coefficients, 
C a vector of factors related to the country and where ν and u represent the respective error terms.   
 
Furthermore, the characteristics of situations where bribery occurs include the symmetry of 
information. As corruption takes place between two or more actors, information plays an important 
facilitating role in the transaction and information asymmetries are found to reduce the probability of 
a transaction being corrupt (Ryvkin & Serra, 2011). Therefore, a complete model of corruption should 
include the party of the ‘bureaucrat’, in addition to the ‘client’. However, regarding this work, 
constructing such a model is beyond the scope and purpose. Nevertheless, it is important to 
understand the existence of these factors to fully understand the empirical analysis provided further.  
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3. Gender and corruption: what the previous research has to say 
 
The aim of this chapter is to summarize the findings made in earlier research on gender factors and 
corruption, both on the level of societies and individual economic actors. First I review findings on 
the aggregate or country level, then micro-level findings based mostly on survey data. Third, there is 
a relatively vast literature based on experimental studies that reveal some gendered aspects of 
corruption. Lastly I discuss some recent findings on how the gender effect changes over different 
institutional environments. In the next chapter I then move on to provide an overview of the 
theoretical explanations proposed for the findings.  
 
The leading finding from previous research on the country level is that, indeed, in countries where 
gender equality is higher and women have a larger share of positions in the public sphere, corruption 
levels appear lower. However, it is not straightforward to insulate the effect of gender in these cases 
as societies with higher gender equality usually tend to perform on other indicators in a way that is 
similarly linked with lower corruption levels. Therefore, there has been serious critique on the 
possibility that the findings are based on spurious correlations.  
 
The micro level studies are rather consistent in revealing a difference between the genders in how 
often citizens or business managers are asked for bribes, with women ending up involved with 
corruption less often than men. Regarding personal values, there is evidence that women in general 
may be less condoning of corruption. However, not all studies show this and it is possible that 
differences again emerge from differences in the ability to benefit from corruption on the part of those 
women that do not participate actively in society.  
 
Based on the experimental studies that I have had the possibility to get acquainted with, it is 
impossible to arrive in any definitive conclusion concerning the gender-corruption connection.  Some 
studies do find tendencies that suggest women might be less susceptible of corruption, whereas even 
more studies fail to find any significant gender difference. Therefore, experimental evidence casts 
some doubt over the hypothesis that there would exist a universal difference in the propensity to 
commit corrupt acts between the genders. More likely explanations would be that the gender 
difference in corruption is driven by differences in opportunities or; in case a gender effect exists, it 
is either produced or activated by certain environments.  
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3.1 Aggregate (country) level empirical studies 
 
As Boehm (2015) notes, it is easy to spot the correlation between higher gender equality and lesser 
corruption by the common corruption indicators. The field of research in the link between gender and 
corruption more or less emerged from two pioneering studies (Dollar, Fisman & Gatti, 2001; Swamy, 
Knack, Lee & Azfar, 2001). The pioneering studies both employ indicators of the participation of 
women in national parliaments, governments and labor force as independent variables to explain 
variation in levels of corruption in respective countries. 
 
Increasing the presence of women in national parliaments indeed seems to lead to a reduction in 
perceived corruption, when controlling for the respective changes in civil liberties, income and 
education (Dollar, Fisman & Gatti, 2001). Also, the presence of women in national parliaments 
together with the share of women in senior positions in public administration and the share of women 
in the labor force seem to jointly have similar explanatory power over lower levels of corruption in a 
country.  
 
The pioneering studies took into account some possible sources of spurious correlation, such as civil 
liberties, levels of education and GDP. Some measures of liberal democracy have still been shown to 
render measures of gender equality insignificant in studies replicating the pioneering works (Sung, 
2003; Sung, 2012). The validity of this critique has, however, rightly received critique for potentially 
depending on the inclusion of an indicator of rule of law as an explanatory variable in the analysis, 
(Treisman, 2007). Rule of law and corruption measures in the early studies are very closely related 
and therefore predicting one with another leads to an endogeneity problem. Nevertheless, the 
discussion suggests that liberal democratic institutions may be a common underlying cause to both 
lower corruption and higher gender equality. 
 
Furthermore, there might be a reverse causality in action behind the observations of participation of 
women decreasing corruption levels. E.g. if lower corruption levels impose restrictions on male-
dominated networks, this provides more opportunity for women to progress in their careers. (Frank, 
Lambsdorff & Boehm, 2011) 
 
Studies reporting the robust correlation between gender equality and corruption also lack proof of a 
causal mechanism, where the underlying cause of lower corruption levels would be in the increased 
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presence of women in public life. Furthermore, the explanation provided that on the level of the 
individual, women can act less tolerant of corruption and therefore decrease the level of corruption 
in the society when their share increases, runs into ecological inference (Sung, 2003; Alhassan-Alolo, 
2007; Goetz, 2007).  
 
Furthermore, all the early studies seeking to establish a connection between gender and corruption on 
the macro level in societies proxy for corruption using subjective perception based measures, the 
limitations of which I have discussed already earlier.  The use of the subjective measures leaves room 
also for the possibility that the experts giving their input to the surveys implicitly consider the 
proportion of women active in the societies and factors relevant to that as an input, potentially biasing 
the measures upon their conception.  
 
 
3.3 Observations from micro level data 
 
Studies with micro level data that have included gender as a variable have been mostly based on 
surveys that have inquired respondents on their experiences on corruption. Another source of data 
that has been used to draw conclusions on corruption are surveys on personal values of respondents. 
I review both types in the following.  
 
Most of the studies based on surveyed corruption experiences find that women are less likely than 
men to be targeted with requests for bribes, but also to report payments of bribes. However, a repeated 
hypothesis to stand behind this is that it may arise solely from women having less contacts with public 
officials. The surveys on personal values show that women appear often less condoning of bribery 
than men. However, stated values do not necessarily translate into action and women on average may 
simply disagree with corruption, because they may not be in the position to benefit from it.  
 
Drawing on the ICVS dataset by UNICRI with 55 000 households from 30 countries worldwide, 
women are targeted with attempts to elicit bribes less often than men (Mocan, 2008). A similar 
tendency has been confirmed on data from Latin America (Seligson, 2006) and Africa (Justesen & 
Bjørnskov, 2014). In a European context there are mixed findings with women either equally or less 
often asked for bribes as men (Lee & Guven, 2013). Further similar findings have been made in 
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business context with data from Georgia (Swamy et al 2001) and worldwide data (Breen et al, 2015), 
with women appearing as paying bribes less often than men.  
 
The findings from data based on corruption experiences may have several different explanations. In 
addition to the possibility that women have morals higher than men, women might simply not have 
similar opportunities to engage in corrupt dealings due to discrimination. In the Georgian business 
context, for example, women can be less likely to belong to old boy networks sharing bribes or simply 
due to less collective experience from the labor force, women have not yet adapted to the corrupt 
practices as far as men have (Swamy et al, 2001). When exposure to public officials is not controlled 
for, it is also possible that women have less dealings with officials than men, therefore ending up 
involved with corruption similarly less often.  
 
Surveys based on personal attitudes gathered worldwide has been found to show that women tend to 
view corruption in a more negative way than men (Swamy et al, 2001). However, there have been 
contradicting findings in European context with a general population survey (Lee & Guven, 2013); 
in India among bureaucrats in homogeneous positions (Vijayalakshmi, 2008) and in Nepal with data 
collected from people walking on streets (Truex, 2010).  
 
An important notion is that for example in the survey utilizing Nepalese data, the responses were 
collected from people walking in the streets, thus more likely to be active members of the society 
(Truex, 2010). It is likely that an individual’s social role and degree of participation in the public 
sphere decides the extent of that individual’s exposure to corruption, which furthermore can cause 
differences in attitudes toward corruption. Also, if women in general or a subset of women is 
benefiting from corruption less than the general population their attitudes toward corruption may be 
harsher than the average view (Alatas, Cameron, Chaudhuri, Erkal and Gangandharan, 2009).  
 
 
3.2 Experimental evidence 
 
As mentioned above, the association of higher number of seats in parliaments held by women in a 
society and women’s lower corruption or attitudes condemning corruption in surveys do not 
necessarily predict how these women will behave when actually placed in a situation involving 
corruption, especially when non-trivial amounts of money are involved (Alatas, Cameron, Chaudhuri 
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& Erkal, 2009). This shortcoming has partly been addressed with evidence from experiments both in 
lab and in the field. It is only through experiments that the corrupt acts can be broken into their sub-
acts and different aspects can be explored, such as whether people are willing to engage in a corrupt 
act; are people willing to reciprocate when someone else offers a bribe or a gift (Chaudhuri, 2012). 
Experiments can be especially helpful in establishing causality, but external validity of experiments 
can be questionable. Therefore they can at best be used to test hypotheses in smaller samples.  
 
I will shortly review the results found in some experiments with a focus on the gender aspects of 
corruption11. There is significant variety in the settings in which these experiments have been 
conducted. The most important finding is that whereas there is often no gender difference associated 
to acts of bribery, whenever a difference arises, it tends to be that female behaviour favors corruption 
less than male (Chaudhuri, 2012).  
 
A majority of experimental studies explore the role of women as bribees, whereas my empirical study 
concentrates nearly exclusively on women in the role of the briber. In some contexts, no differences 
between genders are found (Alatas et al, 2009; Waithima, 2011; Armantier & Boly, 2011). In some 
contexts, again, experimental evidence speaks for women offering bribes less often than men (Alatas 
et al, 2009; Rivas, 2013).  
 
Alatas et al (2009) perform a set of experiments in four different locations12, finding women to offer 
bribes less frequently in Melbourne, whereas they report no significant gender differences from New 
Delhi, Jakarta and Singapore. They find a similar pattern by location when testing whether there is a 
gender difference in propensity to accept a bribe: only in Melbourne are women reported with less 
frequently accepting bribes. In one other study conducted in Stuttgart, Germany (Schulze & Frank, 
2003), a difference is found showing women less frequently accepting bribes. However, experimental 
evidence from other studies in Stuttgart, Germany (Björn & Schulze, 2000),  in Ouagadougou, 
Burkina faso (Armantier & Boly, 2011) and Barcelona, Spain (Rivas, 2013) fail to find gender 
differences in acceptance of bribes.  
 
Alatas et al (2009) observe the same geographical pattern a third time when testing for subjects’ 
propensity to punish corrupt behavior. Australian women are, however, this time found to be less 
willing to punish for corrupt acts, when the punishment involves a cost. Waithima (2011) observes 
                                                 
11 For example Chaudhuri (2012) provides a more detailed survey with methodological discussion  
12 Melbourne, New Delhi, Jakarta, Singapore 
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no significant gender differences in Kenyan context. When it comes to reciprocating a bribe, the 
evidence is again mixed. In experiments held in European contexts, women show a lesser propensity 
to reciprocate a bribe (Lambsdorff, 2011; Rivas, 2013). Armantier and Boly (2011) report that women 
seem to respond to monitoring and punishment by failing the briber more often, suggesting perhaps 
a greater sensitivity to risk among women.  
 
Moreover, in an experiment on propensity to deceive another for personal gain, Dreber and 
Johannesson (2008) (again in a Western European context in Stockholm, Sweden), observe women 
deceiving others less often than men. However, in an experiment in Ethiopia, gender again is not 
shown to be related to risk of expropriation in a statistically significant way (Barr;Lindelow;& 
Serneels, 2009). Lastly, Rivas (2013) interestingly finds that both women and men tend to offer larger 
bribes to men than to women.  
 
The evidence from empirical studies draws a picture, where any universal gender difference in 
readiness to act corrupt, provided the opportunity, is hard to see. Furthermore, even as some studies 
do report a gender differential, their relative number may be inflated by publication bias. 
Experimental studies without significant effects observed are not likely to get published. (Frank, 
Lambsdorff & Boehm, 2011).  
 
 
3.4 Effect of context 
 
Both the data from experiments and individual level surveys suggest that there are differences 
between women and men in the prevalence of corruption. Some empirical studies have lately 
emerged, proposing that gender differences in risk aversion might cause gender different in corruption 
under certain institutional settings.  
 
Esarey and Chirillo (2013) explain corruption perceptions with the position of women, including a 
dimension of democracy added to the analysis. They execute their analysis on the country level, 
similar to e.g. Dollar et al (2001). With the explanatory variables being female participation in 
government and institutionalised democracy, they conclude that the relationship between gender and 
corruption does differ by institutional context so that in better established democracies the marginal 
effect of increasing the amount of women in government is higher than in more autocratic settings. 
The proposed explanation is that women are more averse to the risks of violating political norms and 
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because gender discrimination makes violating institutional norms a riskier position for women than 
men. (Esarey & Chirillo, 2013)  
 
Breen et al (2015) analyse gender differences in the business context using the World Bank Enterprise 
Surveys data set. They use three different institutional or cultural variables to capture the effect of 
different settings: democracy, rule of law and religion. They find that in general, female managers 
and business owners are associated with less corruption in the business. Also on the micro level, they 
find support for the hypothesis that context matters. Women in business have a greater association 
with lower bribery in democracies. They run regressions also with corruption perceptions, finding 
that culture, however, has a stronger link with attitudes than with outcomes.   
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4. What might cause gender differences in corruption 
 
The review of evidence from previous research in the previous chapter reveals that gender often 
observed together with differences in attitudes, behavior or with simply encounters of corruption. 
There is no conclusive evidence for the mechanism(s) behind these differences. In this chapter I 
review the popular potential explanations that have been given to explain the phenomenon. These 
explanations include (1) women either inherently or induced by prevailing cultures express higher 
integrity and moral standards than men; (2) women as a minority are relatively excluded from 
opportunities to engage in corruption; (3) by many studies women show a greater risk aversion than 
men, which may lead to the observed differences in corrupt behavior. I also include a discussion of 
the relationship between these potential explanations and different institutional environments.  
 
4.1 Greater female integrity argument 
 
Early on, studies proposed that women might be less likely to sacrifice the common good for personal 
(material) gain (Dollar et al, 2001, p. 424). I call this the greater female integrity argument. There is 
abundant research in fields such as psychology and criminology, indicating that women as a group 
could have higher standards of ethical behavior and be more concerned with the common good of a 
society, as opposed to their own immediate material well-being. As the aim of corruption is to obtain 
personal benefit by acting against the rules, the findings described could be applied to construct an 
argument that women tend to act corrupt less than men.  
 
Many studies lending support to the greater female integrity argument have found that when 
compared to men, women would be more likely to obey rules or demonstrate higher levels of altruistic 
and communal behavior (Betz, O'Connell & Shepard, 1989; Beu, Buckley & Harvey, 2003; Buchan, 
Croson & Solnick, 2008). Inter alia, women can be more likely than men to exhibit ‘helping’ behavior 
(Eagly and Crowley, 1986) or be less deceptive than men (Dreber & Johannesson, 2008).  
 
Even with the body of research pointing to women showing more altruistic behavior than men, the 
issue can be more complex than that. For example, the gender difference in altruism may depend on 
the price of altruistic behavior. Women have been found to behave more altruistic with a relatively 
high price for giving, while lowering the price of giving has led in men being the more altruistic 
gender. Women may care more about equalizing payoffs and therefore appear more altruistic in some 
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studies, but there is not necessarily any link that can be drawn to corrupt behavior. (Andreoni & 
Vesterlund, 2001) 
 
Furhermore, women have found to vote based on social issues (Goertzel, 1983); score more highly 
on ‘integrity tests’ (Ones and Viswesvaran, 1998); take stronger stances on ethical behavior (Glover 
et al., 1997; Reiss and Mitra, 1998); and behave more generously when faced with economic 
decisions (Eckel and Grossman, 1998). Regarding corruption, however, all the findings provide 
circumstantial evidence at most.  
 
The greater female integrity argument necessarily needs to be evaluated also in the context of the 
nature-nurture debate initiated by Kohlberg (1969), making a distinction between inherent, 
genetically determined traits and learned, socially constructed ones. For example, on one hand, 
women may feel more than men — the physically stronger sex, that laws exist to protect them and 
therefore be more willing to follow rules. On the other hand, girls may be brought up to have higher 
levels of self-control than boys which affects their propensity to indulge in criminal behavior 
(Gottfredson and Hirshi, 1990, p. 149).  In case the hypothetical traits of greater integrity among 
women were inherent to the gender, the effects should be to some extent universal. There is no 
possibility to inquire further into this debate in the scope of this work. However, the distinction has 
to be acknowledged when discussing the possibility that increasing the numbers of women in 
influential positions could help fight corruption.  
 
 
4.2 Women as a minority discriminated against and excluded from male networks 
 
The gender differential in propensity to act corrupt may also be framed in terms of gender equality 
rather than in terms of essentialist arguments about greater female integrity (Goetz, 2007). This 
translates into an expectation that women may not appear any less corrupt than men if corrupt 
opportunities and networks are not restrained (Alhassan‐Alolo, 2007).  
 
An individual’s social role and degree of participation in the public sphere decides the extent of that 
individual’s exposure to corruption. When women and men differ in their social roles, one could also 
expect them to differ in their attitudes towards corruption. With a higher level of exposure to 
corruption in daily life might also come a higher tolerance and acceptance toward corruption, as is 
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sometimes observed for men. Women may be more condemning of corruption because they have less 
chances to benefit from it (Alatas;Cameron;Chaudhuri;& Erkal, 2009). In other words, gendered 
nature of access to public life shapes women’s opportunities to be corrupt (Goetz, 2007). This is 
supported by some findings that show no gender difference related to corruption between men and 
women with similar access to society or positions (Vijayalakshmi, 2008; Truex, 2010).  
 
In addition to simply fewer opportunities to act corrupt, a key factor may be the position of women 
as a minority in public life. Women might not afford to behave corrupt in societies where they 
represent a minority in public life and thus a vulnerable class. (Echazu, 2010). Women being a 
minority in public life may also affect the behavior of men that deal with women. In potentially 
corrupt transactions, individuals uncertain with respect to their opponent’s intrinsic corruptibility are 
less likely to engage in corruption, i.e. longer social distance between different genders decreases the 
likelihood of corruption (Ryvkin & Serra, 2011).  
 
If the exclusion of women from male networks and women as a minority being less in a position to 
engage bribery is a major mechanism causing the gender difference in corruption, the difference could 
be expected to diminish in contexts where there is less of discrimination against women.   
 
 
4.3 Risk sensitivity 
 
A third proposed mechanism to explain the gender difference in corruption lies in intrinsic differences 
between the genders in risk aversion. There is a sizable literature in support of the hypothesis that 
women would be on average13 more risk averse than men (Buchan,Croson;& Solnick, 2008; 
Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998; Croson & Gneezy, 2009), whereas risk preference has been found 
significantly related actual reported corruption outcomes (Lee & Guven, 2013). As a cautious remark, 
the differences in degrees of average risk aversion between men and women, although probably 
existing, may not necessarily be large enough to be relevant for real life consideration (Nelson, 2015). 
Thus the differences may not necessarily be significant enough to cause any measurable effect in 
corruption outcomes. 
 
                                                 
13 Croson & Gneezy (2009) suggest the effect to hold outside of managerial populations 
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There is, nevertheless some experimental evidence from research on transactions involving bribery 
that women may respond to monitoring and punishment by shirking the briber more often (Armantier 
& Boly, 2011). If women do react stronger than men when faced with increasing risk related to 
corruption, the sensitivity to risk may play an important role in forming the differences between the 
genders in individuals’ propensities to engage in corruption.  
 
Lately, differences in risk aversion have also been proposed to activate the gender difference in 
corruption in certain contexts (Esarey & Chirillo, 2013). In case of business, in the presence of 
business corruption, more risk averse firms are more likely to offer bribes (Søreide, 2009). Similarly, 
more risk averse individuals can be more likely to offer bribes in contexts where bribery is more 
prevalent and socially accepted – or where, according to the ‘greasing the wheels’ –hypothesis it can 
even be socially desirable to act corrupt. In turn, in societies where corruption is less prevalent and 
detection and punishment more likely, the more risk averse individuals could be expected to steer 
away from corrupt acts.  
 
It has been argued that democratic institutions may be a factor activating the relationship between 
gender and corruption caused by risk aversion. This is due to corruption being stigmatized more in 
societies with strong democratic institutions (Esarey & Chirillo, 2013). Rule of law, related to both 
corruption and democratic institutions, can be another institutional dimension to act as a trigger for 
the gender difference. The risk of undertaking bribery under high rule of law is potentially greater 
with the risk of detection and punishment more likely (Breen, Gillanders, McNulty & Suzuki, 2015). 
Conversely, under predominantly autocratic institutions or low rule of law again it can be more risky 
to not act corrupt, therefore potentially closing the gap between men and women.  
  
33 
 
5. Basis for Empirical analysis 
 
In the previous chapters I have laid the foundations for the empirical analysis. In this chapter I present 
the analysis. I start by describing the data, moving on to formulate hypotheses constructed based on 
the literature review and data available. After the hypotheses setting, I describe the dependent, 
explanatory and control variables after which I describe the model to be estimated. I present and 
analyse the results in the next chapter.  
 
5.1 Description of data 
 
The main source of data for this study is Transparency International  (Transparency International 
Global Corruption Barometer 2013). This is the eighth round of a cross-country individual level 
survey conducted by Transparency International in co-operation with Gallup International. In 
addition I use data from OECD (The OECD Development Centre’s Social Institutions and Gender 
Index (SIGI)) and the World Bank (World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators).  
 
I first present the data sources and discuss them more in depth with each of the variable used.  
 
5.1.1. Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) 
 
My corruption data is from the Global Corruption Barometer, which is a public opinion survey based 
on primary sources and conducted by Transparency International. It provides a measure of people’s 
experience of corruption through questioning individuals about their experiences with corruption. 
Previous studies have more frequently relied on other datasets such as the WBES, which may have 
certain advantages, such as that they distinguish between the frequency and the amount of bribes. 
However, I rely on the GCB as the data set is based on a representative sample of the population, 
whereas the WBES is confined to business people. Simultaneously, the GCB provides a relatively 
global coverage of countries, whereas the ICVS includes data only for 49 countries. The GCB data 
has seen previous use by e.g. Treisman (2007), Weber Abramo (2008) and Gutmann et al (2015).  
 
Transparency International has surveyed more than 114 000 individuals; approximately 1 000 people 
from each of 107 countries for the Global Corruption Barometer 2013 round. The survey has been 
conducted between September 2012 and March 2013. In countries with a population of less than a 
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million, five hundred people have been surveyed. The survey sample in each country has been 
weighted by TI to be nationally representative where possible. In six countries, the sample has been 
of urban population only. The survey questionnaire has been translated into local languages and used 
for face to face, CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing) or online interviews depending 
on the country context. Transparency International has used an independent analyst to verify and 
check the data in addition to its own staff and informs of possible reliability issues for certain 
countries in certain rounds of the survey. 
 
Despite the GCB 2013 data being perhaps the best data available for a global comparative analysis, 
however, cases of misreporting are likely to remain in the sample. For this reason, I do not in this 
paper focus on the level or incidence of bribes per se, but rather on the correlates and directions of 
correlation.  
 
The reticence problem, present especially in questions inquiring directly of clandestine acts by the 
respondents, is corrected to some extent in some questions of the GCB 13 data. In line with the 
indirect questioning technique proposed in literature on measurement of corruption (Reinikka & 
Svensson, 2003; Clausen et al, 2010), the question inquiring directly on the respondents’ involvement 
in bribery is asked with only an indirect reference to the respondent14. 
 
In addition, I apply another technique to mitigate the reticence problem. The questions include three 
possible answers, with ‘Don’t know’ or ‘No answer’ in addition to ‘Yes’ and ‘No’. To refrain from 
outright lies, respondents might refuse to answer some of the more intimidating questions. As 
proposed by e.g. Olken (2009), I performed tests using either answers ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ as the indicative 
response. However, this did not significantly affect any of my results. 
 
Summary statistics of the countries and samples are included in Appendix 1. Summaries of all the 
variables are included in Appendix 2. 
 
5.1.2. OECD Development Centre’s Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) 
 
The second data source, the OECD Development Centre’s Social Institutions and Gender Index 
(SIGI) is an measure of discriminatory social institutions with the initial revision published in 2009. 
                                                 
14 Question 7 is presented referring to ‘in your contact or contacts have you or anyone living in your household’ 
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The aim of the index is to seize the complex relationship between gender equality and discriminatory 
social norms through a multi-dimensional assessment. The SIGI index measures five dimensions of 
gender discrimination, from which an aggregate index is calculated. The indicators for SIGI’s five 
dimension (subindices) include 1)  discriminatory family code; 2) restricted physical integrity; 3) son 
bias; 4) restricted resources and assets; and 5) restricted civil liberties. The aim is to address the de 
jure and de facto situations of discriminatory social institutions across the five sub-indices.  
 
The methodological framework for constructing the index takes into account i) the legislative 
framework; ii) the de facto situation (customary laws and practices, implementation of laws, etc.) and 
practices through prevalence data; and iii) attitudinal data. (OECD Development Centre, 2014) 
 
I choose to use the 2014 edition of the SIGI because there is no data available for the exact year of 
2013, when the majority of the data in use has been collected. The second round of the SIGI data has 
been collected in 2012 with a sample of 121 countries, whereas the 2014 edition offers data on 160 
countries and therefore a far greater coverage. Exactly for use as a universal reference for 
discriminatory social norms, the 2014 revision sees the inclusion of all the OECD countries in the 
index (OECD Development Centre, 2014). Because of this question of data availability, I make the 
assumption that institutional change is sufficiently inert to not have a significant effect on my results, 
which are mainly based on data from 2013.  
 
5.1.3. World Bank Rule of Law measure 
 
Supplementary data to distinguish between societies by their level of rule of law is derived from the 
World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2015). This dataset is used in various 
previous studies (see e.g. Sung (2003); Treisman (2007); Breen et al (2015)). The rule of law indicator 
captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. World Bank constructs this as a composite 
indicator, deriving the data from several different sources (World Bank, 2015).  
 
5.1.4. Polity IV dataset 
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Supplementary data to distinguish between societies by their level of democratic institutions is 
derived from the Polity IV dataset. The Polity IV codes  the authority characteristics of states in the 
world system for purposes of comparative, quantitative analysis and is currently the most widely used 
resource for studying the effects of regime authority (Marshall, 2014).  
 
5.2 Hypotheses setting 
 
I come up with five hypotheses based on the earlier research and the data I have available. The 
purpose of the first hypothesis (1) is to test, whether the finding that women engage in bribery less 
than men does hold true. The four following hypotheses (2-4) aim at testing the three different 
explanations that have been proposed in earlier literature for the difference in the propensity to bribe 
between men and women.  
 
The first hypothesis aims to test, whether the phenomenon witnessed in some earlier studies that 
women tend to pay less bribes than men is visibel in the data I use. I arrive at the following 
formulation: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Women are significantly less likely than men are to report cases of bribery, when being 
exposed to contacts with officials equally to men.  
 
The purpose of the second hypothesis is to test, whether differences between men and women in 
reported bribery might arise from differential treatment of the two genders on average. This yields 
the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2. Women are significantly less likely than men are to report having been asked for 
bribes. 
 
The third hypothesis is constructed to test, whether the behavior of women changes essentially when 
gender-based discrimination changes, yielding the following: 
 
Hypothesis 3. A difference between men and women in the frequency of reported bribery and in 
reported requests for bribes grows when gender-based discrimination against women increases.   
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The fourth hypothesis is intended to test the proposed explanation that gender differences in risk 
aversion drive gender differences in corruption. As this should cause behavioral changes differently 
under different institutions, I arrive at the following formulation: 
 
Hypothesis 4. Women report relatively fewer payments of bribes and more refusals to pay bribes in 
institutional contexts, where bribery is less condoned. 
 
The last hypothesis is an attempt to capture possible essential differences in the propensity of different 
genders to behave public-mindedly to a different extent. When clearly facing a decision to bribe or 
not to bribe, groups of individuals demonstrating higher morals should on average be more likely to 
refuse paying. This yields the following:  
 
Hypothesis 5. Women are significantly more likely than men to report having refused payments of 
bribes, all other things equal.   
 
 
5.3. Variable definitions 
 
Based on the hypotheses constructed, I construct four different dependent variables and two 
explanatory variables. To analyze the effect of institutional setting, there are further two variables 
that I use to split the data to conduct analysis on subsets thus constructed. In addition, there are six 
control variables. I describe all of the variables in the following. 
 
5.3.1 Dependent variables 
 
There are altogether four dependent variables, emerging naturally from the data. I consider the 
primary dependent variable, whether the respondents report a bribe paid in the previous 12 months.  
The data I draw from responses to a question, whether the respondent reports having paid bribes 
conditional to having had a contact with an official. Another dependent variable indicates, whether 
the respondent reports contact with officials in the past 12 months. As a third dependent variable I 
include whether the respondents report a bribe requested by officials in their lifetime. The fourth 
variable again indicates, conditional to having been asked for a bribe, whether the respondent reports 
bribe payment refused over the respondent’s lifetime.  
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The survey design incorporates two sets of two questions that inquire the respondents about their 
dealings with public officials. They all originally include three answer options, ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and 
‘Don’t know/No response’. I construct a binary dummy variable from each of the questions, 
indicating when the respondent has answered ‘yes’ to the question. I have performed a robustness 
check with constructing the variables indicating for the answers stating an explicit ‘no’15, but this 
does not change the results and I report only the results for the direct ‘Yes’ answers.  
 
I describe the structure and construction of the dependent variables in more detail in the following.  
 
Dependent variable 1. Contact with officials 
The first dependent variable, indicating a contact with officials in the past 12 months is derived from 
the GCB survey question Q7A: In the past 12 months, have you or anyone living in your household 
had a contact with the following institutions/organizations? The organizations included in the survey 
are Education system, Judicial system, Medical and health services, Police, Registry and permit 
services, Utilities, Tax and Land services. The possible answers to the question are ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and 
‘Don’t know/No response’. I construct a binary dummy variable from the responses by coding the 
‘Yes’ –answers as 1 and the rest as 0.  
 
The purpose of including this variable is to supply information on whether there are significant 
differences in the propensities of men and women to have contact with public officials. In many 
studies finding a difference between men and women in the frequency of encounters of bribery, a 
question has been left open whether the difference arises from different probabilities to have contacts 
with public officials.  
 
A shortcoming of this variable is that it only indicates whether there has been at least one encounter 
of some of the officials surveyed. It is possible that there are differences between the respondents in 
how many times in total they have used the services provided by the officials. However, in case there 
would emerge major differences between groups of respondents, it is unlikely that these differences 
would not emerge visible in the analysis of the constructed variable.  
 
Dependent variable 2. Bribe paid 
                                                 
15 This approach has been proposed by e.g. Olken (2009) and Treisman (2007) 
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The second dependent variable is based on responses to the GCB survey question Q7B: In the past 
12 months have you or anyone living in your household paid a bribe in any form to each of the 
following institutions/organizations? The question has only been asked from the respondents that 
have reported a contact with any of the surveyed eight officials in the past 12 months16. The possible 
answers to the question are ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t know/No response’. I construct a binary dummy 
variable from the responses by coding the ‘Yes’ –answers as 1 and the rest as 0.  
 
Inclusion of this variable provides information on the actual payments of bribes in the respondents’ 
dealings with public officials. Therefore it is relevant for testing hypotheses 1, 3 and 4. The 
respondents are screened out by a previous question on contacts with officials, reducing the sample 
to those that report having had contact with officials. This eliminates a problem with many previous 
studies that have not been able to distinguish between those individuals that have actually had contact 
with officials.  
 
A shortcoming of this variable is that it only indicates whether there has been at least on transaction 
with bribery. It is possible that there are differences between the respondents in how many times in 
total and with how large sums they have bribed officials. However, in case there would emerge major 
differences between groups of respondents, it is unlikely that these differences would not emerge 
visible in the analysis of the constructed variable 
 
Dependent variable 3. Bribe requested 
The third dependent variable is based on the GCB survey question Q12. A. Have you ever been asked 
to pay a bribe? The question has been asked from every respondent of the survey. The possible 
answers to the question are ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t know/No response’. I construct a binary dummy 
variable from the responses by coding the ‘Yes’ –answers as 1 and the rest as 0.  
 
This variable can bring insight to the question, whether lower levels of bribery among women may 
result from women simply being asked for bribes less often, for example because they are not seen 
as having as much money as men, i.e. hypothesis 2. If the hypothesis holds true, we should see a 
negative correlation between the frequency of women being asked for bribes and discrimination 
against women.  
 
                                                 
16 The basis for Dependent variable 1 
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Dependent variable 4. Bribe payment refused 
The last dependent variable is based on the GCB survey question Q12. B. If yes, have you ever refused 
to pay a bribe?. The question has been asked from those respondents that have reported having been 
asked for a bribe, screening out those that don’s report encountering requests for bribes. The possible 
answers to the question are ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t know/No response’. I construct a binary dummy 
variable from the responses by coding the ‘Yes’ –answers as 1 and the rest as 0. 
 
The variable provides information on the respondents’ behavior when put into a situation, where they 
need to make a choice between corrupt and non-corrupt behavior. This is relevant to hypothesis 5, as 
a refusal to pay may be interpreted as an action representing a higher moral standard and thus 
individuals that are more likely to answer yes to this question could be considered less susceptible of 
corruption.  
 
The interpretation of the data included in this variable is, however, not straightforward. Not every 
respondent may be in a situation to actually refuse a bribe payment when the person asking for a bribe 
is in an authoritative position relative to the respondent. Therefore, mainly in contexts with few 
discrimination against women and a high rule of law, we should see an increase in the rates of refusal 
for women if we were to expect that women are less corrupt than men.  
 
 
5.3.2. Relationship between the four dependent variables 
 
The dependent variables 1 and 2 are based on the Question 7 of the GCB 2013 survey. The question 
refers to the dealings with public officials and possible bribery in contact of the respondents by either 
themselves or other individuals living in their household17. The time span the question refers to is the 
past 12 months.  
 
The dependent variables 3 and 4 are based on the Question 12 of the GCB 2013 survey. The question 
refers directly to requests of bribes and possible refusals to pay by the individual respondent. The 
time span this question refers to is ‘ever’.   
 
                                                 
17 Despite the loose wording, the type of question is regularly interpreted to describe the personal dealings of the 
respondents. (Transparency International, 2010) 
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Figure 1 below illustrates the structure of a transaction between a bureaucrat and a client as a tree 
model. The information presented by dependent variables 1 and 2 are highlighted.  
 
Figure 1 Illustration of information available from Question 7 
 
 
Figure 2 below illustrates again a structure of a transaction between a bureaucrat and a client. The 
information presented by dependent variables 3 and 4 are highlighted.  
 
Figure 2 Illustration of information available from Question 12 
 
 
The four dependent variables all include information relevant to different stages of a transaction with 
bribery. Ideally, there would be data on all the steps for individual transactions.  
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However, due to the survey design, the data is not directly comparable. First, the reference to the 
subject leaves room for different interpretations. Dependent variables 1 and 2 include only a 
circumstantial reference to the respondent, whereas the data in dependent variables 3 and 4 refer 
directly to the respondent. Second, the time span is different. Dependent variables 1 and 2 are based 
on experiences reported for the last 12 months whereas the dependent variables 3 and 4 are based on 
experiences for the complete lifetime of the respondents.  
 
The limitations of the data brought in by the survey design essentially limit the power of the analysis 
made based on it. I mainly deal with the dependent variables separately. When looking at the results 
acquired for the different dependent variables derived from different survey questions in parallel, it 
needs to be acknowledged that the data is not directly intercomparable. However, the data is derived 
from a single sample of individuals, suggesting a rather close relationship between the results. 
 
 
5.3.3. Explanatory variables 
 
Gender of the respondent and an interaction between gender and level of gender-based 
discrimination18 are the explanatory variables in the analysis. Data on gender is derived directly from 
the GCB 2013 survey data. Additional data on gender-based discrimination comes from OECD 
Development Centre. The discrimination data is aggregated on the level of a country and linked to 
each respondent by their country of residence.  
 
Explanatory variable 1.  Female 
The primary explanatory variable of the analysis is the dummy variable female. It takes a value of 
one if the respondent is female, zero if male. The complete sample of 113 270 observations consists 
of 56 447 (49.8%) of female and 56 823 (50.2%) of male respondents.  
 
Explanatory variable 2. Discrimination 
The secondary explanatory variable is discrimination against women in their respective countries, 
relevant for hypothesis 3. The data is derived from the OECD Development Centre’s Social 
Institutions and Gender Index. I do not include this variable as an independent predictor, but I utilize 
an interaction between the primary explanatory variable Gender and the secondary explanatory 
                                                 
18 The level of a country 
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variable Discrimination to determine whether the standing of women in a society activates the 
difference between gender and corruption.  
 
I do not include the discrimination against women as a separate standalone explanatory variable as it 
is included in country fixed effects with which I control for aggregate macro-level factors in a society 
affecting corruption. Also, social institutions influencing a society’s attitude toward gender inequality 
may have an impact on corruption also in other ways, e.g. by altering the functioning of political 
systems. (Inglehart, Norris & Welzel, 2002; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif & Meyer, 2007) 
 
Due to data missing for a substantial number of countries from the original aggregate SIGI index of 
gender equality, I construct my own sub-index with data from measures in the dimensions of 
discrimination against women most relevant for corruption. This allows me to utilize most of the 
observations from Transparency International GCB data as only five countries19 from the original 
sample are excluded from the analysis with the variable for discrimination.   
 
The two sub-indices from the OECD SIGI dataset included in my adjusted Discrimination index are 
Resricted civil liberties, and Restricted resources and assets. As suggested by Branisa et al (2013), 
the restrictions in civil liberties of women may be of a particular relevance to corruption as they are 
especially harmful for active involvement of women in the public sphere. Furthermore, similarly 
relevant to corruption are the restrictions on the control of resources and assets by women, added in 
the current form of the indicator the 2014 revision of the SIGI. Considering payments of bribes, ewer 
access to resources directly affects the ability of an individual to pay. Also, an individual with a lesser 
perceived ability to pay a bribe may be asked for bribes less often, thus bringing down the frequency 
of bribery for the affected group (Goetz, 2007). The other sub-indices do not bear a similarly direct 
relevance to corruption.  
 
The sub-indices are calculated by the OECD Development Centre and the exact methodology can be 
found in the SIGI Methodological Background Paper (OECD Development Centre, 2014). The 
Restricted civil liberties sub-index covers indicators for equal access to public space, political voice, 
political quotas, political representation and workplace rights. The restricted access to resources and 
assets sub-index includes variables for  secure access to land, secure access to non-land assets, access 
to financial services and land titles owned by women.  
                                                 
19 The countries not present in the SIGI data are Kosovo, Solomon Islands, South Sudan, Taiwan and Vanuatu 
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For the calculation of the new index Discrimination, I follow the same procedure as the OECD, where 
the resulting index is an unweighted average of a non-linear function of the sub-indices.  
 
Discrimination = 1/2 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠2 + 1/2 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠2 
 
The non-linear function arises from assumptions that 1) inequality related to gender corresponds to 
deprivation experienced by the affected women and 2) deprivation increases more than proportionally 
when inequality increases. Therefore a higher level of inequality is penalized in each of the 
dimensions. (OECD Development Centre, 2014) 
 
The range of the resulting indicator goes from 0 to 0.816 with a mean of 0.191. The range of the SIGI 
index with all the five sub-indices included goes from 0 to 0.56 with a mean of 0.19. The resulting 
discrimination indicator is correlated to a higher degree with the SIGI composite index than any of 
the two sub-indices used to compute the indicator. Simultaneously the country coverage of the 
resulting index is far greater than that of the complete index.  
 
Table 1 Pairwise correlations of SIGI components and the Discrimination index 
 
SIGI-index 
2014 with all 
five sub-
indices   
Restricted 
resources 
and assets 
sub-index 
Restricted 
civil liberties 
sub-index 
Discriminati
on 
(constructed 
index) 
SIGI-index 2014 with all five 
sub-indices   
1    
Restricted resources and 
assets sub-index 
0.77 1   
Restricted civil liberties sub-
index 
0.70 0.40 1  
Discrimination (constructed 
index) 
0.85 0.80 0.80 1 
All correlations are significant with p<0.001 
 
5.3.4. The Sample Splits 
 
I examine the effect of gender on corruption in different types of institutional settings to test for 
hypothesis 4, i.e. the possibility that gender differences in corruption are driven by gender differences 
in risk aversion. To perform the analysis, I split the sample two times, by two different institutional 
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dimensions, ending up with four sub-samples. The dimensions, following previous research (Breen 
et al, 2015) are the rule of law and democratic development. I use the Rule of Law score from World 
Bank Worldwide Governance indicators to measure rule of law and Polity IV dataset to measure 
regime type.  
 
The World Bank measure for rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence (World 
Bank, 2015). Corruption overlaps with many of the concepts covered by the measure and the measure 
is also used as a component in the World Bank Control of Corruption Index (World Bank, 2015). 
 
I determine a country as one with a high rule of law if the country’s Rule of Law score (ranging from 
approximately -2.5 to 2.5) is equal to or higher than zero. Correspondingly, countries with a Rule of 
Law score below zero I consider as low rule-of-law. A similar method has been applied by e.g. Breen 
et al (2015). The decision to split the sample and analyze the high and low rule-of-law samples as 
separate cases is informed by the fact that the theoretical explanations for the relationship between 
corruption and gender may differ for different settings. As discussed above in more detail, corruption 
may be easier to use in a country with a low rule of law, as the risk for detection and punishment may 
often be higher in countries with high rule of law.  
 
The Polity index is a combined indicator constructed as the difference between two components, 
democratic and autocratic tendencies in a country (Marshall, 2014). Following the literature in 
political science (Breen et al, 2015), I code a country as a democracy if its Polity score is equal to or 
greater than six, whereas countries with a Polity score of less than six I code as possessing more 
autocratic than democratic tendencies. 
 
 
5.3.5. Control variables  
 
I control for several important individual characteristics that have the potential to affect corruption 
outcomes. The control variables chosen are justified with findings from earlier literature on what 
determines the frequency of corruption on the level of an individual. In addition, I use country fixed 
effects to control for institutional and cultural differences between countries. The aim is to extract the 
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effect of gender, holding constant as many as possible other factors both on individual and contextual 
level.  
 
The control variables drawn from the individual data and linked to the individual respondents are age 
group, Education, Employment status, Income and Rural/urban. For aggregate country-level effects 
of institutional, cultural and economic setting, I control for by including Country fixed effects. In the 
following, I provide more details on control variables used. I include a summary of all the variables 
in Appendix 2.  
 
Respondent’s age group 
The respondents are divided in four groups by age20. A separate dummy variable is assigned to each 
group, the variable taking value one, when the individual respondent belongs to the corresponding 
group and zero otherwise. Age under 25 corresponds to a respondent age of below 25 years, with 21 
283 individual observations. A group Age 25-50 covers ages from 25 to 50 years with 61 628 
observations, group Age 51-65 includes ages from 51 to 65 years with 19 451 observations and Age 
65+ ages above 65 years with 7 211 observations. There are 3 697 observations missing data for the 
age category. Age 25-50, the primary working age population acts as the base group and is therefore 
excluded from the regression specification.  
 
Education 
To control for the effect of education, the respondents are divided into three groups by their level of 
education. The groups are assigned dummy variables, the variable taking value one, when the 
individual respondent belongs to the corresponding group and zero otherwise. Respondents with a 
highest attained education of secondary level are assigned the dummy variable Secondary education, 
including 22 780 observations. The dummy variable Higher education covers for respondents with a 
high level education (university), with 49 217 responses. These two groups are compared against the 
rest of the sample with less education.  
 
Employment status 
                                                 
20 The data includes also a continuous variable for age, but the number of missing values is 5985, which is somewhat 
greater than with the categorical classification (The respondents may be hesitant to reveal their exact age, or in the case 
of the least developed countries, may not be able to tell their exact age accurately). I have decided to use the categorical 
value for analysis for the sake of greater coverage. 
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In order to control for the effect of occupational status, the sample of respondents is divided in three 
groups according to their employment status. The groups are assigned dummy variables, the variable 
taking value one, when the individual respondent belongs to the corresponding group and zero 
otherwise. The 63 342 respondents that report their status as employed, in either the public or private 
sector, individual businesses or agriculture are assigned the dummy variable Employed. The 12 277 
respondents reporting as unemployed, but seeking for employment, are assigned the dummy variable 
Unemployed. The third category, Not working covers for the individuals not working21 with 33 699 
observations falling into this category. Respondents that have preferred not to answer the question or 
that have the data missing amount to 3 952.  
 
Income 
The control variable for the effect of income differences between individuals is also constructed with 
an ordinal variable with five income quintiles. The individuals are each assigned a category by their 
total household income before taxes, arranged into country-level quintiles by the Transparency 
International. I have assigned each quintile its own dummy variable to capture possible non-linear 
effects of income. The lowest quintile is represented by dummy variable Income 1, the second by 
Income 2, the third by Income 3, the fourth by Income 4 and the fifth by Income 5. The lowest income 
quintile is the base category in the regression specification and thus excluded.  
 
Rural/urban 
The control variable for the type of environment is a categorical dummy variable urban, which takes 
value one for respondents living in urban and zero for respondents living in rural households.  
 
Country fixed effects 
The 113 270 individual survey responses are collected from 107 different countries worldwide. 
Countries represent the greatest level of geographic detail the respondents can be separated with. As 
each country differs from the others by institutional, cultural and economic settings, I have included 
a dummy variable for each country. This is to control for any country fixed effects, i.e. the effect of 
the environmental factors specific to each of the countries. The variable Country includes a three-
letter code for each country as a factor variable. The first country in alphabetical order (Afghanistan 
(AFG)) acts as the base category against which the others are compared.  
 
                                                 
21 Unfortunately the data does not distinguish between students, individuals staying at home such as housewives or retired. 
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5.3.6. Summary of variable correlations  
 
I present summary tables of the variables and the correlations between the independent variables in 
Appendices 2 and 3. Excluded from the independent variables correlations are the country dummy 
variables. However, I perform my analysis with cluster robust standard errors, clustering on the 
country level. On the correlations between other independent variables, I find no significant 
correlations of concern and assume there are no problems of multicollinearity. Most notably, the 
primary explanatory variable gender is correlated with the variable ‘not working’ by 0.21 on 0.01% 
significance level, likely due to a significant portion taking care of households as could be expected. 
In addition to employment status, gender is correlated with the level of education and level of income 
of the respondents.  
 
 
5.4. Model specification 
 
I proceed to formulate the model to estimate, finding basis from the theoretical consideration 
presented earlier. I return to the equation 
 
pii = β1
′Yi β2 
′Cj + νi + uj 
 
which I employ as the basis for a maximum-likelihood probit model, through which I model the 
impact of gender on the dependent variables. The probit model belongs to the family of binary choice 
models (or univariate dichotomous models), which are designed to model the ‘choice’ between two 
discrete alternatives. As all the dependent variables are of a binary nature, the probit model suits the 
purpose of this analysis well. The model essentially describes the probability of a dichotomous 
outcome, depending on other characteristics attributed to a case (Verbeek, 2008). This yields the 
following function: 
 
Pr(event) = βx + ε, 
 
where x is a matrix of characteristics inherent to the individual and others, β the vector of coefficients 
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and ε is the error term. I apply the same model to all the dependent variables, assuming that the 
outcomes measured by each of the variables are affected by the same characteristics. The model to 
fit is 
 
Pr(answer = positive) = Φ(βixij) 
 
with Φ as the cumulative normal function; answer taking the value 1 if the individual respondent has 
given a positive answer to the four survey question asked that act as the dependent variables; i the 
number of parameters to estimate and j is the individual. The country-level parameters are included 
in the model as individual characteristics and are identical for all observations that share the same 
country of origin. 
 
The four different equations that are estimated in the base analysis. 
 
Dependent variable 1. The dependent variable will take value 1 if the respondent reports to have 
had contact with officials in the last 12 months. 
 
Pr(contact) = Φ(βixij) 
 
Dependent variable 2. The dependent variable will take value 1 if the respondent reports having 
paid a bribe in any of the contacts with public officials surveyed in queston Q7A.  
 
Pr(bribe) = Φ(βixij) 
 
Dependent variable 3. The dependent variable will take value 1 if a respondent reports ever having 
been asked for a bribe. 
 
Pr(request) = Φ(βixij) 
 
Dependent variable 4. The dependent variable will take value 1 if a respondent reports ever having 
refused to pay a bribe.  
 
Pr(refusal) = Φ(βixij) 
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I include the effect of gender-based discrimination to female respondents with the inclusion of an 
interaction variable between the explanatory dummy variable Female and the other explanatory 
variable Discrimination. This allows me to analyse the specific effect of discriminating institutions 
to women.  
 
Using the probit, it is possible to calculate the marginal effects of the variables on the probability 
dPr(answer = 1)/dxi, which can be read as the change in the probability of paying a bribe when the 
variable xi changes its value with all other things equal. However, as discussed before, there is such 
uncertainty concerning the magnitudes of effects that in my analysis I concentrate merely on the 
directions and relative magnitudes of the different coefficients. Furthermore, the marginal effect 
calculation for an interaction term is hard to interpret in a meaningful way.  
 
I apply cluster and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered by country throughout the 
analysis to cope with heteroscedasticity. As a robustness check I duplicate the analysis with a linear 
probability model (Verbeek, 2008).   
51 
 
6. Results of the empirical analysis and discussion 
  
I first review the results for the full sample, providing results for hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 5. Second, I 
move on to discuss the results for the sample splits to see how the results change in different 
institutional settings. This is mainly relevant to Hypothesis 4. Furthermore, the sample splits act as a 
robustness check for the other hypotheses. The results from the empirical analysis largely confirm 
hypotheses 1 and 2. Hypothesis 3 receives some support while hypotheses 4 and 5 are rejected. 
 
I present summary tables for the regressions, including the dependent variables and the explanatory 
variables, excluding control variables for clarity. Full probit regression summary tables with the 
control variables are included in Appendix 4. The samples for the regressions have been adjusted to 
only include cases with complete observations for each variable included, accordingly affecting the 
sample sizes.  
 
 
6.1. Results for the full data sample 
 
The results for the full data sample largely confirm the Hypothesis 1. In the results presented in Table 
3, women appear less likely than men to pay bribes to public officials. Women are statistically 
significantly to the level p < 0.01 less likely than men to report having been involved in transactions 
with bribery in the previous 12 months. This is not driven by female gender being associated with 
fewer contacts with officials. There is an association between female gender and The results are 
reinforced by the simple probabilities in table 2. 33.5% of men that have had contact with public 
officials report having paid a bribe at least once, while the figure for women is only 27.7%. The 
frequency of men and women to report contact with public officials in the past 12 months, not 
controlling for any other characteristics, is very close to equal.  
 
Hypothesis 3, testing for the effect of discrimination to bribery reported by women relative to men 
does not receive strong support from the regression results for the dependent variable 2, presented in 
Table 3. With the inclusion of the interaction between the dummy variable gender and the country-
level indicator for gender-based discrimination, the association between reported bribes and gender 
alone is somewhat weakened, but remains strongly statistically significant. The coefficient for the 
gender-discrimination interaction is negative, as stated in the hypothesis, but fails to achieve 
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statistical significance even at the level p<0.1. The Akaike information criterion, however, shows that 
the relative quality of the model improves when the interaction between the gender dummy and the 
country-level discrimination indicator is included. 
 
Table 2 Simple probabilities of Dependent variable outcomes by gender, complete data 
 
DV1 Contact with 
public officials in 
the past 12 
months 
DV2 Transaction 
in the past 12 
months included 
bribery 
DV3 Respondent 
has ever been 
asked for a bribe 
DV4 Respondent 
has ever refused 
to pay a bribe 
after a request 
Female 74.1% 27.7% 28.5% 62.4% 
Male 74.8% 33.5% 37.7% 62.4% 
 
 
Table 3 Regression results for dependent variables 1 and 2 
 
 Dependent variable: 
  
 
Contact with 
officials 
Bribe paid 
Contact with 
officials 
Bribe paid 
 
Female -0.031 -0.132*** 0.021 -0.111*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.031) 
     
Female:Discrimination   -0.253** -0.094 
   (0.110) (0.113) 
     
Constant 0.729*** 0.304*** 0.728*** 0.306*** 
 (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) 
     
 
Observations 104,615 78,640 100,603 75,139 
Log Likelihood -36,128.160 -39,514.340 -34,766.170 -37,544.670 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 72,482.320 79,230.680 69,750.330 75,283.350 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Interestingly, the inclusion of the gender-discrimination interaction appears to have an association 
with the probability of women having contact with public officials. The results in Table 3 show that 
the likelihood that women report contact with officials decreases, when the presence of gender-based 
discrimination increases.  The result is statistically significantly to the level p<0.05. The inclusion of 
the gender-discrimination interaction term increases the relative quality of the model, indicated by 
the Akaike information criterion lower than in the model without the interaction term.  
 
Hypothesis 2, proposing that women and men are not treated equally by public officials, receives 
strong support from the results presented in Table 4. The likelihood of reporting requests for bribes 
by officials is strongly negatively associated with female gender, indicated by a p value <0.01 for 
cases with and without the inclusion of the gender-discrimination interaction term. The same 
tendency is visible in Table 2, where the simple probability for women to have reported requests for 
bribes is only 28.5% against 37.7% figure for men.  
 
Table 4 Regression results for Dependent variables 3 and 4 
 
 Dependent variable: 
  
 Bribe requested 
Bribe payment 
refused 
Bribe requested 
Bribe payment 
refused 
 
Female -0.250*** 0.005 -0.251*** 0.047* 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.028) (0.025) 
     
Female:Discrimination   -0.002 -0.150** 
   (0.097) (0.076) 
     
Constant -0.017 0.241*** -0.015 0.244*** 
 (0.028) (0.032) (0.029) (0.033) 
     
 
Observations 104,615 36,408 100,603 35,237 
Log Likelihood -53,223.430 -22,873.090 -51,028.320 -22,100.060 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 106,672.900 45,972.170 102,274.600 44,418.120 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
54 
 
The inclusion of the interaction term between female gender and the indicator for gender-based 
discrimination does improve the relative quality of the model, measured with the Akaike information 
criterion. However, the coefficient for this factor does not appear as statistically significant nor does 
it have a high magnitude, undermining Hypothesis 3. This suggests that the reason for public officials 
not asking women for bribes as often as they do ask men might lie somewhere else than in the forms 
of discrimination directed at women.  
 
Hypothesis 5 has the purpose of testing, whether women are more strongly opposing corruption by 
refusing bribe payments when asked for one. This hypothesis cannot be outright rejected. The simple 
probabilities in Table 2 show an identical percentage of men and women to report having refused a 
bribe payment when asked for one. Also the regression results in Table 4 do not show any strong or 
statistically significant association between gender and the probability to have refused bribe payments 
when the gender-discrimination interaction term is not included in the analysis. However, upon the 
interaction term and therefore control for discrimination, there emerges an association between 
female gender and a higher probability to report having refused to pay a bribe, significant to p<0.1. 
The same regression indicates a relationship between female gender and a lesser likelihood to refuse 
payments of bribes under conditions of higher gender-based discrimination. This result seems 
sensible in the light that institutional discrimination against an individual’s group intuitively makes 
it harder to refuse requests from an authority.  
 
Based on the results from the complete data set, I conclude that Hypotheses 1 and 2 can be accepted 
based on the data. There indeed is a robust correlation between female gender and fewer reports of 
bribes paid in transactions with public officials. A similarly robust correlation there is between female 
gender and the likelihood of reporting having been asked for bribes. This would strongly suggest that 
the reason behind women not bribing as often as men would lie in differences in treatment of the 
genders by public officials. However, it must be emphasized that although the domain of respondents 
for the survey data is uniform, the questions from which the dependent variables used to test for these 
hypotheses are not directly comparable.  
 
Hypothesis 3, intended to test for the effect of discrimination, again is more or less rejected by the 
data. The data fails to show a significant association between either the reports of bribe payments or 
reports of bribe requests by women and the level of gender-based discrimination in a society. The 
independent variable discrimination does seem to incorporate some new and relevant information as 
55 
 
the fit of the model improves with the inclusion of the term and the interaction term used gains 
meaningful coefficients predicting other dependent variables.  
 
Hypothesis 5 is supported by the negative coefficient of the interaction between female gender and 
gender-based discrimination predicting the probability of respondents to refuse payments of bribes. 
Simultaneously, the coefficient for female gender alone emerges as positive, hinting at the possibility 
that women under some circumstances do refuse paying bribes easier than men do. When the gender-
discrimination interaction is not included in the analysis, there emerges no difference between men 
and women in relation to dependent variable 4. It must, however, be noted that the interpretation of 
dependent variable 4 is not very simple, as there are likely to be many different factors affecting the 
dynamics of deciding to pay or refuse paying a bribe.  
 
 
6.2. Results for sample splits by institutional settings 
 
I present results for the four sub-samples with different institutional characteristics to evaluate 
hypothesis 4 of gender differences in risk aversion causing gender differences in corruption. The 
results for the sub-samples also act as a robustness check for the analysis of the complete sample 
presented in part 6.1. Different from the previous presentation, I go through the four different 
dependent variables one at a time, presenting the results for both the sample splits simultaneously.  
 
The analysis of the results for the sub-samples leads me to reject hypothesis 4. Hypotheses 1 and 2 
receive further confirmation. Hypothesis 3 appears also relevant in certain cases. For hypothesis 5 
there is very modest indication of relevance.   
 
 
6.2.1. Dependent variable 1: Contact with officials 
 
The simple probabilities of the respondents’ answers to whether there has been a contact to public 
officials in the 12 months preceding the survey are presented in Table 5. There is rather minor 
variability in the responses and no pattern emerges by the types of societal institutions.  
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Table 5 Probabilites to report contact with officials by gender and institutional context 
 High Rule of Law Low Rule of Law Democracy Autocracy 
Female 77.2% 72.5% 72.9% 76.7% 
Male 76.7% 74.0% 72.9% 78.7% 
 
No definite pattern emerges in the results shown in Table 6 on any gender effect on the probability to 
report contact with public officials over a 12-month period. There is a consistently negative 
coefficient for the interaction term between female gender and gender-based discrimination against 
women, but the coefficient is statistically significant (p<0.05) only in the context with high rule of 
law. More importantly, when the interaction term is included, gender alone bears no statistically 
significant correlation with the probability to report contact with officials. Without the inclusion of 
the interaction term, there is a somewhat weak correlation between female gender and the probability 
to report contact with officials in contexts of low rule of law and dominant autocratic institutions. 
Including the consideration for discrimination mitigates this correlation. Inclusion of the interaction 
term improves the quality of the model in all the cases, judging by the Akaike information criterion.  
 
Table 6 Split sample regression results Dependent variable 1 
 Dependent variable: 
 Contact with officials 
  
 High rule of law Low rule of law Democracy Autocracy 
 
Female 0.021 0.075*** -0.059** -0.030 -0.008 0.028 -0.070* -0.012 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.039) (0.024) (0.025) (0.039) (0.055) 
         
Female:Discrimination  -0.455**  -0.107  -0.199  -0.240 
  (0.230)  (0.120)  (0.123)  (0.176) 
         
Constant 0.794*** 0.765*** 0.753*** 0.742*** -5.590*** -5.590*** 0.738*** 0.723*** 
 (0.044) (0.053) (0.046) (0.045) (0.182) (0.183) (0.060) (0.058) 
         
 
Observations 34,804 33,299 68,772 66,265 65,667 63,160 34,197 33,197 
Log Likelihood -12,730 -12,293 -22,692 -21,767 -22,289 -21,331 -11,425 -11,017 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 25,554 24,677 45,540 43,686 44,731 42,811 22,939 22,124 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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My interpretation of the results of the split-sample regression for dependent variable 1 is that 
generally there are relatively minor gender-differences in the probability to have contact with public 
officials. Discrimination against women is, however, a factor to consider in some contexts.  
 
 
6.2.2. Dependent variable 2: Bribe paid 
  
Hypothesis 4 of higher risk aversion driving the gender difference in bribe payment higher in societies 
less condoning of bribery does not receive support from the data. When looking at the simple 
probabilities over all the different sub-samples presented in Table 7, women are consistently less 
likely than men to report payments of bribes, given a reported contact with officials. Interestingly, 
the gender difference is the smallest over contexts with a high rule of law, where also the overall 
reports for bribe payments are the least frequent.  
 
The results from the regression analysis similarly contradicts hypothesis 4. The pattern emerging in 
the simple probabilities does not change when other attributes are controlled for. Women appear 
consistently less likely to report paying bribes than men do. However, the magnitude of the 
correlation is lower in contexts of high rule of law than in ones of low rule of law. Similarly, under 
dominantly democratic institutions the gender effect is lower than under dominantly autocratic 
institutions. Thus the data speaks strongly for rejecting hypothesis 4.  
 
Table 7 Probabilites to report involvelment in bribery by gender and institutional context 
 High Rule of Law Low Rule of Law Democracy Autocracy 
Female 13.7% 36.4% 21.7% 40.8% 
Male 16.3% 43.1% 27.3% 47.0% 
 
The results in Table 8 lend further support to hypothesis 1 that women indeed pay less bribes than 
men do. When the interaction between female gender and gender-based discrimination is not 
included, women are less likely to report payments of bribes in every institutional context.  
 
Hypothesis 3 that did not receive significant support from the results derived from the complete 
sample, again when tested for the smaller sub-samples, is supported by results in certain contexts in 
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Table 8. When the rule of law is high, the difference between men and women appears nearly 
completely driven by the interaction between discrimination in a society and female respondents. The 
coefficient for the interaction variable is relatively high in magnitude and statistically significant for 
the sub-samples for both dominantly democratic and autocratic institutions. Only for the institutional 
setting of low rule of law the inclusion of the gender-discrimination interaction term does not change 
the coefficients by much. The inclusion of the interaction term adds to the relative quality of the 
model for each sub-sample, measured by the Akaike information criterion.  
 
Table 8 Split sample regression results Dependent variable 2 
 
 Dependent variable: 
 Bribe paid 
  
 High rule of law Low rule of law Democracy Autocracy 
 
Female -0.074*** -0.026 -0.154*** -0.153*** -0.136*** -0.094*** -0.150*** -0.082* 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.026) (0.041) (0.029) (0.032) (0.030) (0.048) 
         
Female:Discrimination  -0.322***  0.010  -0.281*  -0.227** 
  (0.082)  (0.131)  (0.163)  (0.115) 
         
Constant -2.100*** -2.110*** 0.284*** 0.279*** -0.911*** -0.917*** 0.236*** 0.234*** 
 (0.057) (0.064) (0.039) (0.040) (0.046) (0.049) (0.039) (0.040) 
         
 
Observations 26,908 25,557 51,060 48,910 48,431 46,295 26,587 25,727 
Log Likelihood -9,428 -8,695 -29,740 -28,498 -21,078 -19,861 -16,805 -16,223 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 18,944 17,477 59,618 57,130 42,289 39,851 33,695 32,530 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
6.2.3. Dependent variable 3: Bribe requested 
 
Hypothesis 2 is essentially confirmed by the results for every sub-sample split by the institutional 
qualities. Women report consistently and remarkably less occurrences of requests for bribes. The 
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gender difference is visible in all the contexts in the simple probabilities in Table 9, as well as in the 
regression results in Table 10.  
 
Table 9 Probabilites to report having been asked for a bribe by gender and institutional context 
 High Rule of Law Low Rule of Law Democracy Autocracy 
Female 13.6% 37.4% 24.5% 37.7% 
Male 20.0% 47.4% 33.4% 47.8% 
 
The results of the split-sample regressions for dependent variable 3 speak further for that hypothesis 
3 proposing gender discrimination as an influential factor behind the gender differences in corruption 
should not be outright rejected. Instead the results suggest discrimination does play a role in 
determining the gender-corruption relationship. The interaction term between female gender and 
gender-based discrimination against women emerges statistically significant in contexts of high rule 
of law and dominant autocratic institutions, but not for contexts of low rule of law and dominantly 
democratic institutions. The inclusion of the interaction variable again improves the relative model 
quality measured by the Akaike information criterion.  
 
Table 10 Split sample regression results Dependent variable 3 
 Dependent variable: 
 Bribe requested 
  
 High rule of law Low rule of law Democracy Autocracy 
 
Female -0.268*** -0.246*** -0.245*** -0.247*** -0.270*** -0.287*** -0.245*** -0.138*** 
 (0.033) (0.041) (0.025) (0.036) (0.028) (0.032) (0.032) (0.041) 
         
Female:Discrimination  -0.258**  0.015  0.091  -0.389*** 
  (0.121)  (0.104)  (0.150)  (0.131) 
         
Constant -1.660*** -1.670*** -0.052 -0.052 0.874*** 0.875*** -0.067 -0.064 
 (0.039) (0.043) (0.036) (0.037) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.046) 
         
Observations 34,804 33,299 68,772 66,265 65,667 63,160 34,197 33,197 
Log Likelihood -13,429 -12,717 -39,394 -37,906 -30,164 -28,876 -20,806 -20,112 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 26,951 25,527 78,945 75,965 60,481 57,899 41,701 40,313 
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Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
6.2.4. Dependent variable 4: bribe payment refused 
 
There is again no support for hypothesis 4 of higher risk aversion by women to lead in less corrupt 
behavior under institutions less condoning of bribery. The results derived dependent variable 4, the 
probability of refusing a bribe when one is requested, show relatively few gender differences overall, 
whereas for the hypothesis to hold true, women should be more likely to refuse bribe payments under 
institutions, where risk of detection and punishment is higher.   
 
Table 11 Probabilites to report having refused to pay a bribe by gender and institutional context 
 High Rule of Law Low Rule of Law Democracy Autocracy 
Female 67.1% 61.4% 65.4% 57.4% 
Male 68.4% 61.0% 64.9% 57.6% 
 
Table 12 Split sample regression results Dependent variable 4 
 
 Dependent variable: 
 Bribe payment refused 
  
 High rule of law Low rule of law Democracy Autocracy 
 
Female 0.007 -0.027 0.005 0.065** 0.028 0.051* -0.021 0.040 
 (0.046) (0.069) (0.022) (0.026) (0.029) (0.030) (0.026) (0.048) 
         
Female:Discrimination  0.245  -0.210***  -0.082  -0.209** 
  (0.159)  (0.080)  (0.129)  (0.105) 
         
Constant 1.210*** 1.240*** 0.239*** 0.245*** 0.850*** 0.856*** 0.189*** 0.190*** 
 (0.093) (0.097) (0.036) (0.036) (0.061) (0.063) (0.038) (0.039) 
         
 
Observations 6,115 5,842 30,189 29,291 20,428 19,820 14,656 14,171 
Log Likelihood -3,647 -3,486 -19,153 -18,538 -12,397 -12,005 -9,682 -9,350 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 7,387 7,065 38,462 37,228 24,947 24,159 19,455 18,790 
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Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
There is no clear gendered pattern in the simple probabilities for bribe payment refusal in Table 11. 
Instead, the percentages are very close to each other for both genders. The results of the regressions 
in Table 12 confirm this. Gender alone as an explanatory variable does not emerge as a significant 
predictor of refusals to pay bribes. However, it should be further noted that the analysis of the results 
presented in Table 12 suffer from the sample sizes being remarkably reduced.   
 
Hypothesis 5, stating that women would on average show less corrupt behavior when faced with a 
direct decision does not receive strong support from the results for the sub-samples. There is a minor 
effect that appears statistically significant in the context of low rule of law (p<0.05) and dominant 
democratic institutions (p<0.1) when the interaction term between female gender and gender-based 
discrimination is included. In the same samples, the coefficient for the interaction term appears 
statistically significant and relatively high in magnitude. 
 
 
6.3. Control variables 
 
The statistical associations between the control variables and the dependent variables emerged largely 
as expected, thus confirming the validity of the choice of control variables. I briefly discuss the main 
findings in here. Summary tables of binomial probit regressions with the full data sample, including 
a presentation of the control variables, are presented in Appendix 4. All the regressions include 
dummy variables for individual countries to account for the country fixed effects, but they are not 
included in the summary tables for clarity of presentation.  
 
Age emerges as a statistically significant factor associated with the frequency of reported payments 
of bribes and the frequency at which individuals report having been asked for bribes. The earlier 
finding that the youngest and oldest individuals are asked for bribes less often than the individuals in 
the most active age (Mocan, 2008) is confirmed by the data. Also, an association between higher age 
and lesser  propensity to pay bribes (Torgler & Valev, 2006) is supported by the results. Age does not 
emerge as a robustly statistically significant correlate with the frequency of reported contacts with 
public officials or refusals to pay bribes.  
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Higher education appears also as a statistically significant correlate with reported bribe payments. 
Individuals with a higher education are less likely to report payments of bribes, confirming some 
earlier findings (Truex, 2010). Earlier research has suggested increasing levels of education to be 
correlated with higher frequency of bribe requests on the level of an individual. This, however, is not 
supported by my results. Individuals with a secondary education are the least likely report being 
targeted with requests for bribes, but also individuals with a higher education report less requests for 
bribes than the comparison group with education levels lower than secondary. Interestingly, 
individuals with a secondary education seem also the least likely to refuse a bribe when asked for 
one, with the highest educated individuals also reporting fewer refusals than the lowest-educated 
comparison group. Simultaneously, increasing level of education is linked with fewer reported 
contacts with officials.  
 
There emerges a rather robust relationship between higher income and higher propensity to report 
bribes paid. Similarly, higher income is statistically significantly related with higher probability to 
report having been asked for bribes, much in line with earlier research (Seligson, 2006; Mocan, 2008). 
Higher income is also correlated with a higher probability to report having had contact with officials. 
No relation emerges between reports of refusals to pay bribes and different income groups.  
 
Employment status also correlates with many of the dependent variables. Individuals outside of the 
workforce are less likely to report payments of bribes and requests for bribes than those taking 
actively part in the society. Unemployment again is associated with fewer contacts to public officials. 
The variables do not show statistically significant associations with the probability to refuse bribe 
payments.  
 
Lastly, urban population appears as slightly more likely than rural respondents to report having 
refused to pay bribes. Otherwise there emerge no statistically significant relationship between the 
urban/rural setting and the dependent variables, although some studies have found urban populations 
to be targeted with bribery more often than their rural counterparts (Mocan, 2008; Justesen & 
Bjørnskov, 2014).  
 
  
6.4. Other methods tested 
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As a robustness check I run analysis with similar specifications to those presented earlier in this 
chapter using the ordinary least squares method (OLS). Summary tables of the results are presented 
in Appendix 5. Additionally, I run analysis experimenting with different types of dependent variables 
to control for potential reticence bias, described in part 5.5.1. None of the alternative methods and 
specifications produce results significantly different than those that arise from the primary binomial 
probit analysis with the primary dependent variables.  
 
 
6.5. Discussion 
 
The overall results from the empirical analysis lend strong enough support to hypothesis 1 that it can 
be accepted. Women are less likely to report having paid bribes, confirming earlier findings claiming 
that women indeed emerge as a group being less likely to bribe than men (e.g. Swamy et al, 2001; 
Breen et al, 2015).  
 
Considering the reasons behind the robust difference between men and women in the probability to 
pay bribes, a gendered bias in treatment of individuals seems likely to play an important role. My 
analysis supports my hypothesis 2 fairly robustly, indicating that there is a difference between the 
genders in how individuals representing their respective gender are treated by public officials on the 
average. Women consistently report requests for bribes less often than men do, similar to many earlier 
findings (e.g. Seligson, 2006; Mocan, 2008).  
 
The described gender difference in bureaucrats’ treatment of clients may be explained by 
discrimination, or women being seen as less wealthy and able to pay (Goetz, 2007). As women are 
often a minority in the public sphere22, there may be a higher social distance between a female client 
and the average public official. Social distance again has been shown to decrease levels of corruption 
in transactions (Ryvkin & Serra, 2011). 
 
However, it cannot be completely ruled out that the bureaucrats would be sufficiently able to 
distinguish between their clients, only asking for bribes from those clients that they can assume to 
pay. This leaves room for the possibility that women indeed for a reason behave more public-
mindedly than men as a group, leading to lower levels of bribery in transactions involving a woman. 
                                                 
22 Demonstrated e.g. by the OECD SIGI index 
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Furthermore, women may be asked for non-monetary bribes more often than men and these might 
show differently in the data.  
 
My analysis does not imply a robust relationship between women’s propensity to behave corrupt and 
gender-based discrimination against women. However, in many occasions the term involving 
country-level gender discrimination did gain significance in the analysis and I do not reject the 
hypothesis 3, stating that gender discrimination should explain the gender difference in bribery. The 
association of discrimination with women’s self-reported bribery levels did appear often enough that 
I see motivation to research the topic further with an improved research design.  
 
The recently proposed mechanism that women’s higher risk aversion would cause women behave 
less corrupt in certain contexts (Esarey & Chirillo, 2013) did not receive support from my analysis. 
Instead, the analysis showed slight changes in the coefficients for the explanatory gender variable, 
but these changes were of the opposite direction from the hypothesis. Therefore, I reject hypothesis 
4.  
 
I also attempted to establish a connection between gender and a clear situation of choice by 
individuals to bribe or not to bribe. Evidence in support of hypothesis 5 from the analysis was scarce 
and the interpretation is not necessarily on a solid basis, given that there are other factors affecting 
the individual’s behavior but just the moral stand on corruption. In some cases when including the 
interaction between female gender and gender-based discrimination, there emerged a very slight 
association with female gender and a higher likelihood to refuse payment of a bribe after a request. 
However, this finding depended on the inclusion of the term including discrimination and the 
magnitude of the association appeared in every case on the lower side. Thus, hypothesis 5 is rejected 
with the reservation that the interpretation is based on rather few contextual information.  
 
To conclude, my analysis shows that women appear indeed less likely to pay bribes than men. The 
analysis also shows that women appear less likely to be asked for bribes than men, which is a likely 
explanation for women’s lower propensity to engage in bribery. There is some evidence that higher 
gender-based discrimination may be linked with lower propensity of women to engage in bribery, 
further speaking for gender-differences in treatment by officials as a possible cause for gender 
differences in propensity to bribe. Women being more risk averse than men does not seem as a likely 
explanation for the gender difference in bribery levels. Neither does my analysis show strong 
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evidence for women on average behaving any different from men when facing a simple decision to 
bribe or not to bribe.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
This study confirms the finding made in many previous studies that women appear to engage in self-
reported bribery less frequently than men do. This corruption-gender link proves close to universal 
and robust to a broad set of control variables.  
 
So far, three different mechanisms have emerged in literature to explain this gender difference: 
differences in treatment and opportunities between men and women; women demonstrating higher 
overall integrity for either biological or cultural reasons; and gender differences in levels of risk 
aversion. This study provides evidence to support the hypothesis that the gender difference in 
propensity to engage in bribery originates rather in differential treatment of women than in any innate 
qualities of women.  
 
If the results are in line with reality, increasing the share of women in public life is not likely to cause 
corruption to decrease in a society, although a decrease in corruption levels is often observed 
simultaneously with improving gender equality. The achieved results naturally do not mean that 
improving gender equality would not mean that gender equality should not be promoted for other 
reasons. Neither does it mean that in some micro-contexts increasing women’s participation couldn’t 
cause decreasing corruption rates.  
 
As a perspective for further research, I would consider studying how discrimination against groups 
of citizens affects their propensity to engage in corrupt behavior. The discrimination needs not be 
restricted to only women, but any groups that can be seen as minorities in its respective society. 
Another need for further work is in producing better quality data on the reality of corruption.  
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Appendix 1: GCB 2013 survey summary statistics 
 
The table below describes the countries included in the Global Corruption Barometer 2013 round, the 
organization that conducted the interviews, the size of the sample for each country, the methodology 
used in each country and description of the coverage of population included in the sample.  
 
The three methodologies are abbreviated as follows: 
F2F: Face to face 
CATI: Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing 
Online: Questionnaires filled in electronically online 
 
COUNTRY/territory COMPANY SAMPLE METHOD COVERAGE 
Afghanistan Ascor 2040 F2F National 
Albania BBSS 999 F2F National 
Algeria BJ Consult 1000 F2F National 
Argentina Ibope 1001 CATI National 
Armenia MPG LLC 1068 F2F National 
Australia Colmar Brunton 1206 Online National 
Azerbaijan SIAR 1001 CATI National 
Bangladesh TI-Bangladesh 1822 F2F National 
Belgium iVox 1000 Online National 
Bolivia Ibope 1000 F2F National 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Mareco Index Bosnia 2000 F2F National 
Brazil Ibope 2002 F2F National 
Bulgaria BBSS 1002 F2F National 
Burundi Infinite Insight 1000 F2F National 
Cambodia Indochina Research 1000 F2F National 
Cameroon RMS Africa 1055 F2F National 
Canada Leger Marketing 1000 Online National 
Chile Ibope 1000 CATI Urban 
Colombia Sigma Dos 1001 F2F National 
Croatia BBSS 1000 F2F National 
Cyprus TI-Cyprus 570 Online National 
Czech Republic Mareco 1000 F2F National 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo RMS Africa 1062 F2F Urban 
Denmark DMA Research 1007 Online National 
Egypt REACH 1000 F2F National 
El Salvador Sigma Dos 1000 F2F National 
Estonia RAIT 1000 F2F National 
Ethiopia Reach 1000 F2F National 
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Fiji Tebbutt Research 1000 CATI National 
Finland Taloustukimus 974 F2F National 
France BVA 1009 Online National 
Georgia IPM 1000 F2F National 
Germany Produkt + Markt 1000 Online National 
Ghana TI-Ghana 2207 F2F National 
Greece Alternative Research 1001 CATI National 
Hungary Mareco 1000 CATI National 
India Dataprompt 1025 CATI National 
Indonesia Deka 1000 F2F National 
Iraq IIACSS 1113 F2F Urban 
Israel Brandman 1004 Online National 
Italy Doxa 1010 F2F National 
Jamaica Dichter & Neira 1003 F2F National 
Japan NRC 1200 F2F National 
Jordan Reach 1000 CATI National 
Kazakhstan Romir 1000 CATI National 
Kenya TI-Kenya 1121 F2F National 
Korea (South) Gallup Korea 1500 F2F National 
Kosovo BBSS 998 F2F National 
Kyrgyzstan Romir 1000 F2F Urban (8 cities) 
Latvia RAIT 1054 F2F National 
Lebanon Reach 1000 CATI National 
Liberia RMS Africa 1028 F2F National 
Libya Reach 1000 CATI National 
Lithuania RAIT 1007 F2F National 
Luxembourg TNS 502 Online National 
Macedonia (FYR) Brima 1010 CATI National 
Madagascar ATW Consultants 1049 F2F National 
Malawi Infinite Insight 1000 F2F National 
Malaysia TNS Malaysia 1000 F2F National 
Maldives SRGB 1002 CATI Urban 
Mexico Ibope 1052 F2F Urban 
Moldova BBSS 1211 F2F National 
Mongolia TI-Mongolia 1000 F2F National 
Morocco BJ Consult 1004 F2F National 
Mozambique GSC Research 1086 F2F National 
Nepal 
SRG Bangladesh Ltd 
(SRGB) 1001 
F2F and 
CATI 
National (major 
regions) 
New Zealand Colmar Brunton 1000 Online National 
Nigeria Infinite Insight 1002 F2F National 
Norway CMA Research 1005 Online National 
Pakistan Gallup Pakistan 2451 F2F National 
Palestine PCPO 1039 F2F National 
Papua New Guinea Tebbutt Research 1044 CATI National 
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Paraguay Ibope 1000 CATI National 
Peru Datum 1211 F2F National 
Philippines PSRC 1000 F2F National 
Portugal Marktest 1003 CATI National 
Romania CSOP 1143 F2F National 
Russia Romir 1000 F2F National 
Rwanda TI-Rwanda 1000 F2F National 
Senegal RMS Africa 1054 F2F National 
Serbia TNS Medium Gallup 1011 F2F National 
Sierra Leone RMS Africa 1028 F2F National 
Slovakia Mareco 1000 F2F National 
Slovenia BBSS 1003 CATI National 
Solomon Islands Tebbutt Research 509 CATI National 
South Africa TRS 1000 F2F Urban 
South Sudan Reach 1000 F2F Urban 
Spain Instituto DYM 1009 F2F National 
Sri Lanka Gallup Pakistan 1001 F2F National 
Sudan Reach 1000 CATI National 
Switzerland Isopublic 1004 Online National 
Taiwan Cass Research Centre 1000 Online National 
Tanzania Infinite Insight 1001 F2F Urban + Rural 
Thailand InfoSearchco.Ltd 1000 F2F National 
Tunisia Emrhod 1000 F2F National 
Turkey Barem 1027 CATI National 
Uganda Infinite Insight 1000 F2F Urban 
Ukraine Romir 1200 F2F National 
United ORB 1000 Online National 
United Leger USA 1000 Online National 
Uruguay Ibope Inteligencia 1010 CATI National 
Vanuatu Tebbutt Research 505 CATI National 
Venezuela Sigma Dos 1000 F2F Urban 
Vietnam Indochina Research 1000 F2F National 
Yemen Reach 1000 F2F National 
Zambia TRS 1003 F2F National 
Zimbabwe TI-Zimbabwe 1000 F2F National 
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Appendix 2: Summary table of the variables 
 
Variable code 
Survey question and 
variable coding 
Source N Mean 
St. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Dependent variables 
Contact with 
officials 
Q7. A. 1-8. In the past 12 
months, have you 
or anyone living in your 
household had a 
contact or contacts with one of 
the following? Variable coding 
binary: 1=”Yes” to any sub-
question 
Transparency 
International 
Global 
Corruption 
Barometer (TI 
GCB), round 
2013 
113 270 0.745 0.436 0 1 
Bribe paid 
Q7. B. 1-8. If yes to Q7A, in 
your contact or contacts have 
you or anyone living in your 
household paid a bribe in any 
form in the past 12 months? 
Variable coding binary: 
1=”Yes” to any sub-question 
TI GCB, round 
2013 
84 361 0.306 0.461 0 1 
Bribe requested 
Q12. A. Have you ever been 
asked to pay a bribe? Variable 
coding binary: 1=”Yes” 
TI GCB, round 
2013 
113 268 0.331 0.471 0 1 
Bribe payment 
refused 
Q12. B. If yes, have you ever 
refused to pay a bribe? Variable 
coding binary: 1=”Yes” 
TI GCB, round 
2013 
37 501 0.624 0.484 0 1 
        
Explanatory variables 
Female 
D5. Gender. Binary (0-1): 
1=Female 
TI GCB, round 
2013 
113 270 0.498 0.500 0 1 
Discrimination 
Index. Constructed index is 
unweighted average of a non-
linear function of the sub-
indices ‘Restricted resources 
and assets’ and ‘Restricted civil 
liberties’ 
OECD 
Development 
Centre’s Social 
Institutions and 
Gender Index 
(SIGI) 2014 
109 258 0.191 0.174 0.000 0.816 
        
Sample splits 
Democracy 
Democratic institutions 
dominant. Polity score for 2013 
greater than or equal to 6  
Polity IV Project 113 270 0.655 0.475 0 1 
Autocracy 
Autocratic institutions 
dominant. Polity score for 2013 
less than 6 
Polity IV Project 113 270 0.303 0.459 0 1 
High Rule of Law 
Rule of law high. World Bank 
Rule of Law indicator for 2013 
equal to or higher than 0  
World Bank 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
113 270 0.353 0.478 0 1 
Low Rule of Law 
Rule of law low. World Bank 
Rule of Law indicator for 2013 
less than 0 
World Bank 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
113 270 0.638 0.481 0 1 
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Control variables 
Urban D1. Binary (0-1): 1=Urban 
TI GCB, round 
2013 
109 817 0.597 0.490 0 1 
Age under 25 
D5. Age Category. Binary (0-1): 
1=Under 25 
TI GCB, round 
2013 
109 573 0.194 0.396 0 1 
Age 51-65 
D5. Age Category. Binary (0-1): 
1=51-65 
TI GCB, round 
2013 
109 573 0.178 0.382 0 1 
Age 65+ 
D5. Age Category. Binary (0-1): 
1=65+ 
TI GCB, round 
2013 
109 573 0.066 0.248 0 1 
Unemployed 
D8. Employment. Binary (0-1): 
1=Unemployed 
TI GCB, round 
2013 
111 763 0.110 0.313 0 1 
Not working 
D8. Employment. Binary (0-1): 
1=Not Working (student, 
housewife, retired) 
TI GCB, round 
2013 
111 763 0.302 0.459 0 1 
Secondary 
education 
D7. Education: Highest attained 
Binary (0-1): 1=  
TI GCB, round 
2013 
113 264 0.201 0.401 0 1 
Higher education 
D7. Education: Highest attained 
Binary (0-1): 1= 
TI GCB, round 
2013 
113 264 0.435 0.496 0 1 
Income 2 
D6. Total household income 
before taxes by quintile. Binary 
(0-1): 1=Medium low – second 
quintile 
TI GCB, round 
2013 
113 263 0.233 0.423 0 1 
Income 3 
D6. Total household income 
before taxes by quintile. Binary 
(0-1): 1=Medium – third 
quintile 
TI GCB, round 
2013 
113 263 0.341 0.474 0 1 
Income 4 
D6. Total household income 
before taxes by quintile. Binary 
(0-1): 1=Medium high – fourth 
quintile 
TI GCB, round 
2013 
113 263 0.128 0.334 0 1 
Income 5 
D6. Total household income 
before taxes by quintile. Binary 
(0-1): 1=High – top quintile 
TI GCB, round 
2013 
113 263 0.068 0.251 0 1 
Country 
Factor variable: Country of 
residence of the respondent 
TI GCB, round 
2013 
113 270 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Appendix 3: Pairwise correlations of independent variables 
 
 Female 
Age under 
25 
Age 51-
65 
Age 
65+ 
Secondary 
education 
Higher 
education 
Income 
2 
Income 
3 
Income 
4 
Income 
5 
Not 
working 
Unemployed Urban 
Female NA 0.60229 0.03728 0.75451 0.00000 0.00007 0.02389 0.00384 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00709 0.03917 
Age under 25 0.00155 NA 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.39431 0.00012 0.00573 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00324 
Age 51-65 0.00619 -0.22810 NA 0.00000 0.00000 0.00456 0.55966 0.00000 0.01194 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
Age 65+ 
-
0.00093 
-0.13031 -0.12331 NA 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
Secondary 
education 
0.01625 -0.03573 0.03944 0.07472 NA 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
Higher 
education 
-
0.01186 
0.07154 -0.00843 
-
0.04308 
-0.43984 NA 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.05472 
Income 2 0.00671 -0.00253 -0.00173 0.01713 0.08016 0.01850 NA 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 0.00000 
Income 3 
-
0.00859 
0.01144 -0.02815 
-
0.04514 
-0.05206 0.04845 -0.39645 NA 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00011 
Income 4 
-
0.02353 
-0.00821 -0.00747 
-
0.03741 
-0.09572 -0.02432 -0.21081 -0.27507 NA 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
Income 5 
-
0.02517 
-0.01870 0.01478 
-
0.01830 
-0.08300 -0.04323 -0.14842 -0.19367 -0.10298 NA 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
Not working 0.21561 0.16754 0.06334 0.27460 0.05421 0.02274 0.01356 -0.02600 -0.04005 -0.03415 NA 0.00000 0.33595 
Unemployed 
-
0.00800 
0.05995 -0.02637 
-
0.04302 
0.03034 0.02234 0.01340 -0.04996 -0.05489 -0.05607 -0.23081 NA 0.00000 
Urban 0.00613 -0.00875 0.01594 0.02082 -0.07330 -0.00571 -0.03435 -0.01151 0.05363 0.08449 -0.00286 -0.01585 NA 
 
Note. Cell entries are standardized Pearson correlations. The figures below the diagonal represent the 
correlation values. The figures above the diagonal represent the p-values. See Appendix 2 for detailed 
description of variables. There are both positive and negative correlations.  
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Appendix 4: Full probit regression result tables for full sample with 
control variables shown 
 
Dependent variables 1 and 2 
 
 Dependent variable: 
  
 Contact with officials Bribe paid Contact with officials Bribe paid 
 
Female -0.031 -0.132*** 0.021 -0.111*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.031) 
     
Age under 25 -0.020 -0.013 -0.017 -0.006 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) 
     
Age 51-65 -0.036 -0.069*** -0.037 -0.077*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
     
Age 65+ -0.078* -0.155*** -0.070 -0.152*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.044) 
     
Secondary education -0.175*** -0.048 -0.170*** -0.047 
 (0.044) (0.031) (0.046) (0.032) 
     
Higher education -0.122*** -0.051** -0.112*** -0.051** 
 (0.033) (0.022) (0.030) (0.023) 
     
Income 2 0.051** 0.069*** 0.055** 0.080*** 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) 
     
Income 3 0.077** 0.058* 0.088*** 0.071** 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
     
Income 4 0.157*** 0.130*** 0.169*** 0.137*** 
 (0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
     
Income 5 0.186*** 0.199*** 0.186*** 0.177*** 
 (0.044) (0.048) (0.045) (0.049) 
     
Not working 0.017 -0.080*** 0.014 -0.091*** 
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(0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.025) 
     
Unemployed -0.083** 0.036 -0.079** 0.016 
 (0.034) (0.041) (0.034) (0.037) 
     
Urban 0.011 -0.040 0.008 -0.045 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.037) (0.036) 
     
Female:Discrimination   -0.253** -0.094 
   (0.110) (0.113) 
     
Constant 0.729*** 0.304*** 0.728*** 0.306*** 
 (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) 
     
 
Observations 104,615 78,640 100,603 75,139 
Log Likelihood -36,128.160 -39,514.340 -34,766.170 -37,544.670 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 72,482.320 79,230.680 69,750.330 75,283.350 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
Dependent variables 3 and 4 
 
 Dependent variable: 
  
 
Bribe 
requested 
Bribe payment 
refused 
Bribe 
requested 
Bribe payment 
refused 
 
Female -0.250*** 0.005 -0.251*** 0.047* 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.028) (0.025) 
     
Age under 25 -0.148*** 0.012 -0.145*** 0.008 
 (0.022) (0.027) (0.023) (0.028) 
     
Age 51-65 -0.025 0.005 -0.025 -0.005 
 (0.023) (0.030) (0.023) (0.030) 
     
Age 65+ -0.141*** 0.055 -0.133*** 0.052 
 (0.040) (0.050) (0.040) (0.050) 
     
Secondary education -0.150*** -0.197*** -0.152*** -0.188*** 
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(0.034) (0.042) (0.035) (0.043) 
     
Higher education -0.062*** -0.095*** -0.066*** -0.090*** 
 (0.020) (0.030) (0.020) (0.030) 
     
Income 2 0.062*** -0.003 0.070*** -0.015 
 (0.021) (0.034) (0.022) (0.034) 
     
Income 3 0.102*** -0.002 0.110*** -0.007 
 (0.026) (0.029) (0.027) (0.030) 
     
Income 4 0.187*** 0.010 0.187*** 0.002 
 (0.031) (0.035) (0.031) (0.036) 
     
Income 5 0.255*** 0.052 0.238*** 0.052 
 (0.045) (0.040) (0.045) (0.041) 
     
Not working -0.144*** -0.045 -0.149*** -0.042 
 (0.026) (0.033) (0.025) (0.034) 
     
Unemployed 0.011 0.055 -0.002 0.051 
 (0.036) (0.042) (0.033) (0.044) 
     
Urban 0.009 0.076* 0.008 0.076* 
 (0.028) (0.041) (0.029) (0.041) 
     
Female:Discrimination   -0.002 -0.150** 
   (0.097) (0.076) 
     
Constant -0.017 0.241*** -0.015 0.244*** 
 (0.028) (0.032) (0.029) (0.033) 
     
 
Observations 104,615 36,408 100,603 35,237 
Log Likelihood -53,223.430 -22,873.090 -51,028.320 -22,100.060 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 106,672.900 45,972.170 102,274.600 44,418.120 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Appendix 5: Robustness check with OLS estimation 
 
Complete sample 
 
Dependent variables 1 and 2 
 
 Dependent variable: 
  
 
Contact with 
officials 
Bribe paid 
Contact with 
officials 
Bribe paid 
 
Female -0.005 -0.038*** 0.004 -0.025*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) 
     
Female:Discrimination   -0.047** -0.067* 
   (0.019) (0.038) 
     
Constant 0.769*** 0.617*** 0.768*** 0.619*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) 
     
 
Observations 104,615 78,640 100,603 75,139 
R2 0.430 0.226 0.436 0.231 
Adjusted R2 0.429 0.225 0.436 0.230 
Residual Std. Error 
0.326 (df = 
104503) 
0.411 (df = 
78540) 
0.327 (df = 
100495) 
0.410 (df = 
75043) 
F Statistic 
709.186*** (df = 
111; 104503) 
230.986*** (df = 
99; 78540) 
726.425*** (df = 
107; 100495) 
237.705*** (df = 
95; 75043) 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
Dependent variables 3 and 4 
 
 Dependent variable: 
  
 Bribe requested 
Bribe payment 
refused 
Bribe requested 
Bribe payment 
refused 
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Female -0.072*** 0.001 -0.063*** 0.016* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
     
Female:Discrimination   -0.046 -0.053** 
   (0.036) (0.027) 
     
Constant 0.484*** 0.592*** 0.486*** 0.594*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) 
     
 
Observations 104,615 36,408 100,603 35,237 
R2 0.252 0.067 0.257 0.068 
Adjusted R2 0.251 0.064 0.256 0.065 
Residual Std. Error 
0.412 (df = 
104503) 
0.469 (df = 
36296) 
0.412 (df = 
100495) 
0.469 (df = 
35129) 
F Statistic 
316.888*** (df = 
111; 104503) 
23.584*** (df = 
111; 36296) 
324.044*** (df = 
107; 100495) 
23.953*** (df = 
107; 35129) 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
Sample splits by institutions 
 
Contact with officials 
 
 Dependent variable: 
  
 Contact with officials 
 High rule of law Low rule of law Democracy Autocracy 
 
Female 0.005 0.017*** -0.011** -0.006 -0.001 0.005 -0.014* -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) 
         
Female:Discriminat
ion 
 -0.098*  -0.019  -0.026*  -0.048 
  (0.053)  (0.020)  (0.015)  (0.037) 
         
Constant 0.792*** 0.785*** 0.773*** 0.771*** 0.001 0.001 0.771*** 0.767*** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
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Observations 34,804 33,299 68,772 66,265 65,667 63,160 34,197 33,197 
R2 0.357 0.362 0.470 0.478 0.462 0.471 0.409 0.417 
Adjusted R2 0.356 0.361 0.470 0.477 0.462 0.470 0.408 0.416 
Residual Std. Error 
0.336 (df 
= 34757) 
0.338 (df 
= 33253) 
0.318 (df 
= 68694) 
0.318 (df 
= 66189) 
0.323 (df 
= 65591) 
0.322 (df 
= 63086) 
0.320 (df 
= 34152) 
0.319 (df 
= 33152) 
F Statistic 
419.000*
** (df = 
46; 
34757) 
419.000*
** (df = 
45; 
33253) 
792.000*
** (df = 
77; 
68694) 
808.000*
** (df = 
75; 
66189) 
752.000*
** (df = 
75; 
65591) 
769.000*
** (df = 
73; 
63086) 
538.000*
** (df = 
44; 
34152) 
539.000*
** (df = 
44; 
33152) 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
Bribe paid 
 
 Dependent variable: 
  
 Bribe paid 
 High rule of law Low rule of law Democracy Autocracy 
 
Female -0.014** 0.002 -0.052*** -0.051*** -0.035*** -0.018** 
-
0.054*** 
-0.029 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.018) 
         
Female:Discriminati
on 
 -0.149***  0.002  -0.126**  -0.084* 
  (0.013)  (0.046)  (0.058)  (0.043) 
         
Constant 0.026*** 0.019* 0.610*** 0.609*** 0.185*** 0.180*** 0.592*** 0.592*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) 
         
 
Observations 26,908 25,557 51,060 48,910 48,431 46,295 26,587 25,727 
R2 0.198 0.204 0.171 0.172 0.266 0.275 0.102 0.105 
Adjusted R2 0.197 0.203 0.170 0.171 0.265 0.274 0.101 0.104 
Residual Std. Error 
0.331 (df 
= 26864) 
0.325 (df 
= 25514) 
0.448 (df 
= 50991) 
0.448 (df 
= 48843) 
0.377 (df 
= 48364) 
0.374 (df 
= 46230) 
0.471 
(df = 
26545) 
0.470 
(df = 
25685) 
F Statistic 
154.000*
** (df = 
43; 
26864) 
156.000*
** (df = 
42; 
25514) 
154.000*
** (df = 
68; 
50991) 
154.000*
** (df = 
66; 
48843) 
265.000*
** (df = 
66; 
48364) 
274.000*
** (df = 
64; 
46230) 
73.900*
** (df = 
41; 
26545) 
73.700*
** (df = 
41; 
25685) 
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Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
Q12A 
Bribe requested 
 
 Dependent variable: 
  
 Bribe requested 
 High rule of law Low rule of law Democracy Autocracy 
 
Female -0.057*** -0.037*** -0.081*** -0.084*** -0.070*** -0.068*** -0.086*** -0.046*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) 
         
Female:Discriminat
ion 
 -0.216***  0.016  -0.022  -0.143*** 
  (0.042)  (0.036)  (0.058)  (0.045) 
         
Constant 0.078*** 0.067*** 0.475*** 0.475*** 0.797*** 0.798*** 0.471*** 0.472*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) 
         
 
Observations 34,804 33,299 68,772 66,265 65,667 63,160 34,197 33,197 
R2 0.170 0.179 0.206 0.209 0.302 0.308 0.139 0.143 
Adjusted R2 0.169 0.178 0.205 0.208 0.301 0.308 0.138 0.142 
Residual Std. Error 
0.347 (df 
= 34757) 
0.345 (df 
= 33253) 
0.442 (df 
= 68694) 
0.442 (df 
= 66189) 
0.387 (df 
= 65591) 
0.386 (df 
= 63086) 
0.459 (df 
= 34152) 
0.458 (df 
= 33152) 
F Statistic 
155.000*
** (df = 
46; 
34757) 
161.000*
** (df = 
45; 
33253) 
231.000*
** (df = 
77; 
68694) 
233.000*
** (df = 
75; 
66189) 
378.000*
** (df = 
75; 
65591) 
385.000*
** (df = 
73; 
63086) 
125.000*
** (df = 
44; 
34152) 
126.000*
** (df = 
44; 
33152) 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
Bribe payment refused 
 
 Dependent variable: 
  
 Bribe payment refused 
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High rule of law Low rule of law Democracy Autocracy 
 
Female 0.002 -0.010 0.001 0.023** 0.009 0.017* -0.008 0.014 
 (0.016) (0.023) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.017) 
         
Female:Discriminatio
n 
 0.091*  -0.075***  -0.029  -0.078** 
  (0.053)  (0.029)  (0.046)  (0.038) 
         
Constant 
0.873**
* 
0.881**
* 
0.592*** 0.594*** 0.803*** 0.805*** 0.575*** 0.575*** 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015) 
         
 
Observations 6,115 5,842 30,189 29,291 20,428 19,820 14,656 14,171 
R2 0.066 0.069 0.065 0.066 0.081 0.082 0.040 0.041 
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.061 0.063 0.064 0.077 0.079 0.037 0.038 
Residual Std. Error 
0.455 
(df = 
6068) 
0.456 
(df = 
5796) 
0.472 (df 
= 30111) 
0.471 (df 
= 29215) 
0.459 (df 
= 20352) 
0.458 (df 
= 19746) 
0.485 (df 
= 14611) 
0.485 (df 
= 14126) 
F Statistic 
9.390**
* (df = 
46; 
6068) 
9.500**
* (df = 
45; 
5796) 
27.400**
* (df = 
77; 
30111) 
27.700**
* (df = 
75; 
29215) 
23.900**
* (df = 
75; 
20352) 
24.200**
* (df = 
73; 
19746) 
13.900**
* (df = 
44; 
14611) 
13.600**
* (df = 
44; 
14126) 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
